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DEATH, TAXES, AND COGNITION
LEE ANNE FENNELL*
The psychology of the estate tax is extraordinarily interesting and
surprisingly underexplored. In this Article, Professor Fennell
considers the ways in which behavioral law and economics might
augment and revise existing understandings of the tax and of
redistributive policy generally. The Article is structured around
two puzzles that have been frequently identified in the estate tax
literature: first, why popular opposition to the tax is so great, even
among those who have no reason to expect estate tax liability; and
second, why those whose estates are likely to be subject to the tax
often do not take advantage of the opportunity to lighten the
transfer tax burden through inter vivos giving. Professor Fennell
posits that cognitive theory can help answer both questions and
can thereby contribute to a richer positive account of the estate tax.
She then explores some possible normative implications of this
enhanced positive account, and suggests that the estate tax may
hold greater potential as a redistributive tool than existing
accounts would indicate. The estate tax's impending (yet
temporary) repeal makes the project particularly timely and
important.
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INTRODUCTION
Two puzzles surround the estate tax.' First, why is it so
unpopular, even among those who could not reasonably expect to be
1. 1 will use the term "estate tax" in this Article to refer to the federal estate tax,
I.R.C. §§ 2001-2500 (Lexis 2001). The federal estate tax is linked with the federal gift tax,
id. §§ 2501-2600, and with the federal generation-skipping transfer tax, id. §§ 2601-2700,
to tax transfers of wealth. Almost all states have estate or inheritance taxes as well, most
of which are "pick-up" taxes that collect no more than the state death tax credit allowed
under the federal scheme. See David J. Roberts, Federal Estate Tax Repeal and the State
Tax Burden, 93 TAX NOTES 991, 991-92 (2001) (noting that approximately two-thirds of
all states impose a "pickup tax"-an inheritance or estate tax "based entirely on the credit
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subjected to it? 2 Second, why do people who should expect estate tax
liability do so little to reduce that liability through inter vivos giving?3
These questions, I contend, go to the heart of the economic and
political viability of the estate tax. Finding answers to them can shed
important new light on the tax's potential as a policy tool. While both
questions have been explored separately in the literature, the
possibility that behavioral law and economics might help supply
answers has not yet been systematically analyzed.4 In this Article, I
examine ways in which features of human cognition interact with
rational decision-making processes to generate both excessive
hostility towards the tax and surprisingly low levels of liability-
reducing gift giving.
for state death taxes that is allowed on the federal estate tax return"-while about a third
of the states have an inheritance or estate tax that is computed separately).
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J.
259, 285 (1983) ("The most puzzling political obstacle to estate tax revision ... is that the
American people do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests."); Edward J. McCaffery,
Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1944 (1994) ("Why do people oppose
a very limited, nominally progressive tax, one that has the further advantage of speaking
directly to liberal egalitarian notions of equal opportunity and level playing fields?").
3. See, e.g., James Poterba, Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos
Giving in the US, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 237, 238 (2001) (presenting empirical evidence
regarding inter vivos giving patterns, which "raises the question of why households do not
take advantage of readily available estate tax avoidance strategies"). Economists have
long found such behavior curious. See CARL S. SHOUP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 21 (1966) (discussing findings that present the "startling picture of wealthy
individuals clinging to their possessions throughout life" and asking why there is so little
inter vivos giving); Harold M. Hochman & Cotton M. Lindsay, Taxation, Interest and the
Timing of Inter-Generation Wealth Transfers, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 219, 219 (1967) (noting
"the dismay and consternation with which analysts respond to the well-documented failure
of wealth-owners to take advantage of the 'obvious' tax break afforded, at present, by the
lower effective tax rates on inter vivos gifts," which "suggests the belief, on the economist's
part, that the observed behavior is irrational").
4. To be sure, scholars have started applying the insights, of behavioral law and
economics to tax policy, see, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1863, as well as to questions
of redistribution generally, see, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998). The potential role of
behavioral law and economics in understanding the estate tax has been recognized, but the
topic has not received extended treatment. See Louis Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing
Estate and Gift Taxation, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 164, 201-02
(William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter RETHINKING ] (suggesting some ways that
behavioral law and economics could alter his account); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944-
45 (discussing cognitive aspects of the estate tax); cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts
and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 7 (1995)
(using cognitive theory to explore propensities toward saving and spending in the context
of inheritance).
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The project is an important and timely one. The estate tax's
threatened demise5 makes the tax a current locus of debate, and a
better understanding of the tax can advance this public discourse.6
While my primary goal is to explore how behavioral law and
economics might enrich our understanding of the estate tax and of
redistributive policy generally, I am also interested in exploring the
policy implications that flow from this analysis. The Article,
therefore, addresses both positive and normative questions. I explore
not only why the tax has fallen out of favor and why it affects
behavior in the way that it does, but also why it might be worth saving
and how it might be reshaped along lines more consistent with human
cognition.7
The normative discussion, which I take up in the latter half of the
Article, proceeds from three assumptions that I will set out in brief
here and discuss in more detail later:8 first, that redistribution to
achieve social goals is a valid end of taxation and one that we as a
society will continue to pursue regardless of the fate of the estate tax;
second, that improving equality of opportunity by enabling the less
well-off to better develop their human capital is an especially
legitimate and desirable goal of redistributive tax policy; and third,
that, to the extent we do wish to improve equality of opportunity in
this manner through tax policy, we would prefer to use the tax
mechanism that can generate the largest amount of gain for the
smallest amount of cost. As I will explain, this three-part starting
point is consistent with both efficiency-based and fairness-based
normative theories.9  One need not accept these normative
5. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA")
provides for graduated federal estate tax rate reductions and increased exemptions over
the next several years, with complete elimination of the tax in 2010. Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§§ 501, 511, 521, 115 Stat. 38, 69-72 (June 7, 2001) (codified at scattered sections of
I.R.C.); see David Cay Johnston, Coping with a Tax That Has Nine Lives, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2001, at BU1. In the absence of further congressional action, the tax would
reappear the following year, in 2011. See EGTRRA § 901, 115 Stat. at 150 (adding a
sunset clause). A bill that would have made the repeal permanent died in the Senate on
June 12, 2002, when repeal proponents fell six votes short of the sixty necessary to bring
the issue to the floor. Carl Hulse, Effort to Repeal Estate Tax Ends in Senate Defeat, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Al.
6. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, The Estate Tax: Not Dead Yet, 93 TAX
NOTES 807, 807 (2001) (noting that, because of the complex and temporary nature of the
estate tax reforms, "policymakers will likely revisit the estate tax in the near future").
7. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1864 (explaining that "[t]axing authorities might
seek to exploit cognitive biases in maximizing their revenue intake and minimizing
popular opposition").
8. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
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assumptions, however, to find useful the positive analysis contained in
the Article.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II are organized
around the two estate tax puzzles I have identified, taken up in
reverse order. Part I considers why people actually faced with the
estate tax fail to undertake available steps to avoid liability through
inter vivos giving, while Part II considers the roots of the general
public's apparent distaste for the tax. In each case, I begin by asking
how much of each purported anomaly actually can be explained by
standard economic theory incorporating a traditional rational actor
model. I then go on to consider ways in which behavioral or cognitive
insights augment these explanations. Consistent with the purposes of
behavioral law and economics, which seeks not to displace law and
economics but rather to supplement it so that it serves as a more
useful analytic and predictive tool," I suggest that these rational and
cognitive explanations work together to explain behavior. Together,
Parts I and II demonstrate how behavioral law and economics can
offer an enhanced positive account of the behavior of taxpayers and
the general public with regard to the estate tax.
In Part III, I set forth some normative arguments that flow from
this richer positive account. If increasing the ability of the less well-
off to develop their human capital is a worthy normative goal, and if,
moreover, it is normatively desirable to pursue this goal using a
mechanism that will generate the largest gains at the lowest cost, the
estate tax may have more to recommend it than existing economic
analyses and assessments of political viability suggest. The estate tax
has often been rhetorically associated with one sort of equality of
opportunity-that which results from destroying the wealth of the
more well-off. I suggest that the tax should be reconceptualized as
one designed to enhance equality of opportunity through the raising
and redistribution of tax revenue-that is, as a tax that enhances
opportunities for the less well-off.
An initial question is whether the estate tax works better as a
revenue-raising tax than would another available tax. The low levels
of observed inter vivos giving among people who will be subject to
10. See Jolls, supra note 4, at 1654 (discussing purposes of behavioral law and
economics and emphasizing what it has in common with law and economics). For
background on the scope and purpose of behavioral law and economics, see generally
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
2003]
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the estate tax, and the likely explanations for this phenomenon,
suggest that behavioral distortions may be surprisingly low, which
would make the tax attractive from the standpoint of tax policy.
Further, the answers to the public opposition puzzle suggest that the
current political opposition to the tax (to the extent it represents true
majoritarian preferences)' is in substantial measure a product of
identifiable cognitive phenomena, and that this opposition might be
successfully addressed through changes in the design 'features of the
tax undertaken in light of those phenomena-including the
reconceptualization just described. By linking the estate tax with
specific opportunity-enhancing expenditures, I argue, both the tax
and the expenditures it finances could become more palatable. In
other words, Part III makes the case for reconsidering the estate tax
as a redistributive mechanism, and explains, again turning to
cognitive features, why the estate tax might turn out to be not only
politically feasible, but actually more attractive to the public than
other alternatives.
In Part IV, I briefly sketch some specific design modifications
that might enable the estate tax to work as a uniquely effective
mechanism for redistributing wealth and enhancing equality of
opportunity. I suggest two sets of modifications. The first set
involves reframing the tax, and the second responds to concerns
about values of thrift and family security. The purpose of this final
part of the Article is to stimulate debate and further research into the
potential that the estate tax might hold. The estate tax, I suggest, may
hold enormous untapped potential. Relatively minor surgery could
transform it into a robust mechanism for achieving greater equality of
opportunity at a low cost. Eliminating it would not only cause an
immediate drop in revenue (which must translate either into reduced
benefits or higher taxes elsewhere), but would also eliminate what
could be a uniquely effective redistributive tool.
I. THE CASE OF THE MISSING GiFrs
As currently formulated, the federal estate tax presents ready
opportunities for avoiding taxes and reducing tax liability; for this
reason, it is sometimes dubbed "a voluntary tax."" The most well-
11. See U.S. JOINT ECON. COMM., THE ECONOMICS OF THE ESTATE TAX, 98-J-842-
48, at 30 (Sup. Doc. Y4.EC7:EF8) (1998) (observing that "[v]irtually any individual who
invests sufficient time, energy, and money in tax avoidance strategies is capable of
escaping the estate tax altogether"), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/
estattax/estattax.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), See generally
GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX?: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED
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known and simple of these opportunities is the annual tax-free inter
vivos gift.' 2 Under current law, people can give up to $11,000 each
year to as many individuals as they like without incurring any federal
gift tax liability.3 For example, a wealthy couple with two adult
married children and four grandchildren could make tax-free gifts to
the younger generations totaling $176,000 per year. 4 A program of
annual giving on this scale, if pursued over a period of years or
decades, would be a very effective way of reducing or eliminating
estate tax liability. Over a period of thirty years, for example, our
wealthy couple could transfer $5.28 million to the younger
generations without incurring any federal estate or gift tax liability.5
Moreover, even taxable gifts receive more favorable tax treatment
than bequests, providing further opportunities to reduce tax liability
through inter vivos giving.6 Given the estate tax's relatively high
ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE (1979) (discussing estate tax avoidance techniques). But see
Richard Schmalbeck, Avoiding Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes, in RETHINKING, supra
note 4, at 113, 156 (noting that avoidance "devices have limits" and that "the stories of
complete avoidance of transfer taxes by the very wealthy are mostly hyperbolic"). Tax
avoidance, which involves legal minimization of one's tax liability, must be distinguished
from evasion, which involves illegal attempts to reduce the amount of taxes paid. See
PAUL WEBLEY ET AL., TAX EVASION: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 2 (1991).
12. See Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 120 ("By far the simplest strategy available to
wealthy individuals who wish to make tax-free transfers to subsequent generations
involves the committed, regular use of the annual exclusion.").
13. Through 2001, the exclusion amount was $10,000. I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (Lexis
2001). This exclusion amount increased to $11,000 in 2002. See id. § 2503(b)(2) (providing
for inflation adjustment); Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623,627 (same).
14. See Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 120. Spouse H could make $11,000 in annual
gifts to each of the following eight people: son, daughter-in-law, daughter, son-in-law,
grandchild 1, grandchild 2, grandchild 3, and grandchild 4. Spouse W could make the same
eight gifts to the same eight individuals. Alternatively, one spouse could make all the gifts
($22,000 to each recipient) and the spouses could by mutual consent elect to have these
gifts treated as if half were made by each spouse. I.R.C. § 2513. The gifts do not have to
go to family members in order to be tax-free; this is just a likely giving pattern.
15. The extent to which such inter vivos gifts can reduce estate taxes depends on a
number of factors, including the number of years over which such giving occurs (which in
turn depends on how early the giving begins and how long the donors live), as well as the
number of beneficiaries to whom the gifts will be given and the rate at which the donor
household is accumulating or decumulating wealth. See James M. Poterba, The Estate Tax
and After-Tax Investment Return, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? 329, 341-42 (Joel B. Slemrod
ed., 2000).
16. Only the actual gift amounts received by donees are included in the tax base,
whereas the estate tax base includes not only the amount the heirs actually receive, but
also the amounts deducted in estate tax. See Theodore S. Sims, Timing Under a Unified
Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 39-41 (1984) (explaining this difference in
estate and gift tax treatment). This favorable treatment of gifts is offset somewhat by the
"stepped-up" basis that heirs receive in inherited property at death, although on balance
the tax treatment of gifts appears to still be favorable. See, e.g., Poterba, supra note 3, at
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marginal tax rates and the amount of money that is often at stake, we
might expect substantial amounts of inter vivos giving to be
undertaken to reduce estate tax liability.
In fact, many wealthy people do not take advantage of the tax
savings available through inter vivos giving. For example, James
Poterba finds that "[n]early two thirds of the elderly households for
whom the estate tax may loom as a potential burden are not making
transfers that would substantially reduce their estate taxes, and
increase the net-of-tax bequest received by their heirs." 7 Particularly
surprising is the underutilization of the tax-free annual exclusion.
According to one recent study, taxpayers could reduce their estate tax
liability by as much as sixty-five percent by taking full advantage of
the annual exclusion to make inter vivos gifts within the family. 8 We
might initially think that these households are eschewing the
simplistic device of the inter vivos gift in favor of more elaborate and
effective estate tax avoidance mechanisms, but the continued
collection of substantial revenues through the estate tax suggests that
this is not a complete explanation. 9 For at least some significant
subset of the wealthy, the opportunity to reduce tax liability by giving
wealth away during life is not sufficiently attractive to induce action.
Or, to put it another way, by failing to transfer wealth inter vivos at
reduced tax prices, these families are paying a premium to enjoy the
good of lifetime wealth retention.
The fact that people will spend money to buy (or forgo savings to
keep) something they value should not baffle economists or anyone
else. Yet this particular exhibited preference-for lifetime wealth
retention-is nevertheless surprising to some economists because the
purely economic benefits associated with wealth (liquidity and the
ability to effectively deal with health risks and uncertainties about
length of life) could, in theory, be achieved in other ways without
259-61 (analyzing the possibility that the "step-up" at death in basis for income tax
purposes explains part of the reluctance to give inter vivos).
17. Poterba, supra note 3, at 261.
18. Kathleen McGarry, The Cost of Equality: Unequal Bequests and Tax Avoidance,
79 J. PUB. ECON. 179, 200 (2001); see also Poterba, supra note 3, at 238 (describing "the
estate tax savings available to high net-worth households that use simple gift-giving
strategies").
19. See William G. Gale, Commentary on Chapter 10, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra
note 15, at 350, 351 ("One possibility is that people are engaged in other, preferred forms
of estate tax avoidance. Although there is a substantial amount of estate tax avoidance
activity, it nevertheless appears that people could avoid a large amount of estate tax
liabilities but do not."); Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 156 (noting that the limitations of
avoidance strategies are demonstrated by the fact that substantial revenues are, in fact,
collected).
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stockpiling large quantities of wealth. For this reason, it is worth
exploring why people exhibit this willingness to pay a premium for
lifetime wealth retention.
In the analysis that follows, I begin with the explanations that
emerge from an appropriately rigorous application of the traditional
rational actor model, and then consider how behavioral insights might
augment those explanations. Despite this organizational approach,
nothing of importance turns on whether one agrees with my
categorization of particular explanations as "rational" or
"behavioral," nor does it matter how much of observed taxpayer
behavior one believes is attributable to each category. ° My goal is
not to make a case for the dominance of behavioral factors over
purely rational ones, or even to convince the reader that the
behavioral factors are necessary to explain observed behavior.
Rather, my objective is to provide a fuller set of explanations for an
observed phenomenon that makes better use of the available
knowledge about how human beings might react to a given choice
situation. Rational and behavioral explanations (in whatever
combinations the reader finds convincing) together establish that
people have comprehensible and predictable reasons for strongly
preferring lifetime wealth retention, and that these preferences are
durable and reliable enough to inform tax policy.
A. Rational Explanations for Low Levels of Inter Vivos Giving
The existing literature has explored a variety of possible
explanations for the low observed levels of inter vivos giving.2' These
can be divided into four categories: explanations based on the
accidental bequest hypothesis; explanations based on preferences for
lifetime wealth retention; explanations relating to uncertainty and
bother; and explanations relating to donee circumstances. I will take
these up in turn.
20. I will later add a caveat to this. See infra text accompanying note 196 (observing
that there may be additional normative issues implicated when tax policy exploits
cognitive errors to increase revenue).
21. See, e.g., McGarry, supra note 18, at 202 (analyzing the possibility that a desire to
give equal amounts to one's children, regardless of each child's family size, reduces the
ability of wealthy parents to reduce their estate tax liability optimally); Poterba, supra
note 3, at 252-61 (discussing a number of other possible explanations, including the "step-
up" in valuation for income tax purposes of bequests but not gifts, the donor's concern
that beneficiaries will not use the inter vivos gifts well, the possibility the donor will need
the money, and the possibility that the estate tax may be repealed); Schmalbeck, supra
note 11, at 121-22 (discussing explanations for failure to take advantage of annual
exclusions).
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1. Accidental Bequests
One possibility is that people do not intend to leave bequests at
all, and that any bequests they do happen to leave are merely the
accidental by-products of a lifetime of risk aversion and saving."
Even people who make a conscious effort to spend all their wealth
might guess wrong about their life expectancy and consumption
patterns and end up dying with enough wealth to trigger estate tax
liability. To the extent bequests are indeed accidental, it would not
be at all puzzling that people leaving such bequests would take no
actions designed to minimize the taxation of their estates. If
individuals have no thought of leaving bequests and no thought of
avoiding estate tax liability, the estate tax will understandably have
no impact on their behavior.23 Indeed, if some wealthy persons were
believed to fall into this category, then we might cease puzzling over
their behavior and simply take advantage of it.24
However, this so-called accidental bequest hypothesis has been
questioned. If people are concerned only with having sufficient funds
during their lifetimes, why do they not simply purchase annuities?25
Imperfections in the annuities market provide a partial answer,
although it appears unlikely that people would flock to annuities were
these imperfections removed.26 Further evidence suggesting that
22. See James B. Davies, Uncertain Lifetime, Consumption, and Dissaving in
Retirement, 89 J. POL. ECON. 561, 562 (1981); see also Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility
from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51
STAN. L. REv. 641, 677 (1999) (noting that "a default theory of savings would posit that
we save only because we haven't gotten around to spending; and whatever we still haven't
gotten around to spending by the time of our death we leave to our heirs by default, rather
than letting it escheat to the state"). On the failure of the elderly to dissave as fast as a life
cycle model would predict, see RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 118 (1992).
23. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Uneasy Empirical Case for Abolishing the
Estate Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 495, 508 (1996) (noting that if bequests are "accidental," the
"estate tax has no behavioral impacts").
24. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 180 (discussing "the familiar point that, if bequests
are purely accidental, they can be confiscated completely, with no effect on donors'
behavior or utility"). Of course, potential donees would suffer a utility loss. See id.
25. Richard Posner addresses this point:
The explanation that they do not know when they are going to die and so must
retain wealth in case they live longer than they expect is somewhat superficial; by
using one's wealth to purchase annuities (reverse life insurance, which pays the
annuitant a fixed or variable sum until he dies, with no accumulation) one can be
assured of not leaving a significant estate at death.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 552 (5th ed. 1998); see B. Douglas
Bernheim, How Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the
Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities, 99 J. POL. ECON. 899, 924 (1991).
26. See POSNER, supra note 25, at 552 (discussing inadequacies of annuities);
Bernheim, supra note 25, at 924 (arguing that "many people would stop short of
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bequests are not accidental is found in empirical work showing that
people react to a decrease in the "price" of bequests (that is, a change
in estate tax laws that reduces tax liability associated with leaving
bequests) by decreasing inter vivos giving." We might predict that
the converse would be true as well (that is, an increase in the price of
bequests would result in less bequests and more inter vivos giving) .
If, as it appears, people are paying some attention to the cost of
leaving behind bequests, this means that the bequests cannot be
entirely accidental.
2. Preferences for Lifetime Wealth Retention
A more convincing explanation for lifetime wealth retention is
that, notwithstanding the existence of a bequest motive for many
members of the population, people strongly prefer holding onto their
wealth during life.29  The empirical work described above provides
some support for that thesis-people already retain wealth far
beyond what would be optimal if their only goal were transferring
wealth to recipients at the lowest cost, and they do so to an even
greater extent whenever the tax price of bequests is lowered. If
people attach substantial positive value to maintaining control over
their assets during their lifetimes, as they apparently do, it is not quite
accurate to speak of the estate tax as simply raising the cost of
converting all their assets into annuities, even in the presence of perfect insurance
markets").
27. B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM ET AL., DO ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES AFFECT THE
TIMING OF PRIVATE TRANSFERS? 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8333, 2001) ("We find that households experiencing larger declines in the expected tax
disadvantages of bequests substantially reduced gift giving relative to households
experiencing small declines in the tax disadvantages of bequests. Our estimates imply that
the timing of transfers was highly responsive to applicable gift and estate tax rates.").
Indeed, there is some evidence that death timing can be responsive to some degree to
changes in the estate tax (whether due to decision-making by the decedent or by those
who are making decisions for the decedent, often the heirs). WOJCIECH KOPCZUK &
JOEL SLEMROD, DYING TO SAVE TAXES: EVIDENCE FROM ESTATE TAX RETURNS ON
THE DEATH ELASTICITY 16 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8158,
2001).
28. It is not obvious that the responses would be symmetrical in both directions,
however. There could be cognitive or other factors that lead to a "stickiness" in giving
patterns that might retard changes in one direction or the other. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4, 54 n.133 (1994)
(discussing the phenomenon of wage "stickiness": "[a]lthough wages go up in times of
economic growth, they fall much more slowly than prices in times of recession" (citation
omitted)).
29. See, e.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 121-22 ("[S]ome observers have forcefully
argued that the real barrier to full use of the annual exclusion is the strong preference of
potential donors for the retention of economic power.").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
bequests relative to inter vivos gifts. The estate tax raises the price of
a bundle that includes not only the ability to leave behind bequests,
but also the ability to control one's property throughout one's entire
life.30
The benefits associated with this "bequest-control bundle" are
substantial. As B. Douglas Bernheim and his coauthors explain,
"[u]ncertainty concerning future health status, long-term care needs,
longevity, and future rates of return enhance the option value of
retaining resources until death, and thereby inhibit an aggressive
program of tax-favored giving."'" In addition, simply having money
may be valuable in itself, whether or not one uses it, because of the
range of choice, power, and privilege its possession bestows on the
possessor. 2 Even when the wealth is not really needed, the leverage
it affords (over potential beneficiaries, or over the rest of the world)
is independently valuable.33 As the wealth is transferred, this power
and leverage is diminished accordingly. In addition, the wealthy may
actually view themselves as purchasing a wholly different product
through their bequest-a chance to achieve a limited measure of
immortality-that cannot be achieved through inter vivos transfers at
all.34
3. Uncertainty and Bother
Uncertainty about death reduces the success with which people
can engage in estate tax liability reduction through inter vivos giving,
even if they were quite committed to doing so." To optimize on taxes
30. Barbara Fried discusses this tendency:
[T]he failure of the altruistic wealthy to transfer more inter vivos,
notwithstanding the tax and other advantages of early transfers, is not surprising
in light of many people's desire to retain autonomy and control over their own
resources, their ambivalence about making their children independent prior to
their own death, and, in some cases, their paternalistic concern that children will
lack the wisdom to use their wealth well when young.
Fried, supra note 22, at 654.
31. BERNHEIM ET AL., supra note 27, at 2; see also Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing
Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 103-04 (1990) (discussing clients' "almost
maniacal" desire to retain control over wealth arising from the recognition that "they must
face the unknown before they can face the beyond").
32. See GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 212-18 (David Frisby ed.,
Tom Bottomore & David Frisby trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 2d ed. 1978) (2d ed.
1907); Hirsch, supra note 4, at 24-26 (discussing the psychological utility people may gain
from saving and amassing wealth),
33. See SHOUP, supra note 3, at 22 (discussing donors' "desire to maintain some
degree of control over the actions of others").
34. Hochman & Lindsay, supra note 3, at 221.
35. See SHOUP, supra note 3, at 21 (listing "uncertainty" as the "most important"
reason for low levels of lifetime giving).
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without risking running short of money during life, people without
truly vast fortunes would want to give the least amount that would be
consistent with their goals in reducing estate tax liability. To take the
simplest case, such a person might try to count backward from her
actuarily-determined year of death to begin making inter vivos gifts to
reduce estate tax liability. Of all people adopting this strategy, some
would reduce their estates below the threshold of estate tax liability
before their deaths, while others would die before managing to
optimally reduce estate tax liability. This calculation may be further
confounded by another source of uncertainty-uncertainty about the
growth of the class of donees. People may expect that their ability to
quickly "spend down" their estates through tax-free gifts will grow
over time, as additional grandchildren and great-grandchildren are
born.3" Yet to the extent this does not end up happening, they may
find themselves unable to achieve their estate tax avoidance goals.
Uncertainty about estate tax laws might also dampen estate tax
reduction strategies. Giving a gift inter vivos or otherwise structuring
resources to avoid estate tax liability often means taking irreversible
action, while the policy choice to tax wealth at death is quite
reversible. In our current political climate, it might not make sense to
undertake any irreversible steps to transfer wealth inter vivos if one
would otherwise prefer to hold onto the wealth. A rational donor
would compare the expected cost of bequesting the wealth (which
depends, in turn, on the expected tax rate and one's expected
holdings, as adjusted to account for the chance that the estate tax will
no longer be in force at one's death) with the expected cost of giving
it away now. However, the latest round of estate tax reforms,
including the planned phase-out of the estate tax, occurred after (and
hence could not have been reflected in) the decisions captured in the
existing studies.37 While these latest reforms may help explain why we
might expect inter vivos transfers to drop in the future, the
phenomenon of lifetime wealth retention, as documented to date,
probably has other roots.
Another explanation for undergiving has to do with the costs of
making the calculations necessary to minimize transfer tax liability-
including not only the costs measured in dollars and hours, but also
the psychological distress and unease thatmay accompany having to
36. I thank Mark Gergen for this point.
37. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (citing studies conducted prior to
passage of EGTRRA). Nevertheless, the possibility that the estate tax might be repealed
could have provided a rational basis for failing to transfer wealth inter vivos, even before
the reform legislation established a specific timetable for phasing out the tax.
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think about death and taxes.38 Harold Hochman and Cotton Lindsay
have suggested that one explanation for low levels of inter vivos
wealth transfers is that many of the wealthy simply "refuse to be
bothered" with the details of such taxes, preferring instead to
consume what amounts to a luxury good-the choice to "lead a quiet
life, [and] to ignore the details of the tax structure rather than try to
circumvent them ....
4. Donee Characteristics
An additional cluster of reasons for lifetime wealth retention
relates to donee characteristics. Donors may fear that their children
will not use transferred wealth appropriately, and may delay giving
for that reason.4' Similarly, they may fear that gifts, especially those
received too early in life, will erode their children's work ethics.41
Finally, donors may fear that certain gift-giving patterns might sour
family relationships. For example, Kathleen McGarry has observed a
strong tendency for parents to give equal gifts to their children." This
principle of giving equally to each child would be violated if a donor
had children with different family sizes and attempted to maximize
annual tax-free transfers to the younger generation.43 Because donors
are presumably concerned with the well-being of their donees, and
not simply with transferring money to them at the lowest price, these
negative side-effects of inter vivos gifts must be taken into account.
38. Hochman & Lindsay, supra note 3, at 221.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., BERNHEIM ET AL., supra note 27, at 2 ("Donors may eschew early
transfers because they are concerned that donees will waste the money or that the
transferred resources will not benefit from the donor's superior investment skills.");
Poterba, supra note 3, at 262 (discussing the explanation that "wealthy older households
are not convinced that their children will make appropriate use of funds that they might
receive as a gift"); David Cay Johnston, Talk of Lost Farms Reflects Muddle of Estate Tax
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2001, at 1 (discussing estate tax opponent Frank A. Blethen's
objection to the tax, which he felt forced him "to give half the future growth of his fortune
to his two sons when they were not yet kindergartners even though he had no way of
telling whether the boys would turn out to be industrious, as they did, or scalawags").
41. E.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 121 (observing that one explanation for failure
to take advantage of inter vivos giving as a tax reduction strategy involves "the possible
damage done to young donees"); see SHOUP, supra note 3, at 23 (speculating that the
donor "may not want to spoil his children or grandchildren").
42. McGarry, supra note 18, at 202. But cf. infra note 168 (discussing the possibility
that bequests may be used in a compensatory fashion).
43. See McGarry, supra note 18, at 183-84. For example, a wealthy couple might have
two children, one of whom is married and has six children, and the other of whom is single
and childless. The couple could give the family of the first child $176,000 tax free each
year, while they could only give the second child $22,000 tax free each year. See supra
notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the annual exclusion).
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Donors could structure their gifts and bequests to overcome
most of these problems. For example, donors could address
uncertainties about donees by making gifts through a trust
arrangement that limited the donee's access to the principal,44 or
donors could use the annual exclusions to fund an insurance trust that
would not pay out until death.45 The desire to give equal gifts to each
child could also be accommodated by making adjustments to bequests
that would counteract any short-term inequities. Yet these efforts
could have costs of their own. Aside from the additional transaction
costs that may be involved as estate planning grows more complex,
these planning efforts could mean bringing the family finances out
into the open and raising questions about the ultimate distribution
among siblings and the fitness of beneficiaries to make financial
decisions. Such dynamics might well create or exacerbate family
tensions.
B. Behavioral Explanations for Low Levels of Inter Vivos Giving
Although "rational" explanations for low levels of inter vivos
giving are quite cogent, they arguably fail to fully account for
taxpayer behavior. 6 Adding the insights of behavioral law and
economics can help to fill in any remaining gaps. The relevance of
applying cognitive theory to taxpayer behavior has been noted.47 In
addition, behavioral features have been used to explain why lifetime
savings and spending decisions often fail to match up with the life-
cycle model predicted by economics. It seems plausible, then, that
cognitive features might also help explain the decisions people make
(or fail to make) about accumulated wealth when confronted with the
estate tax.
1. Optimism, Procrastination, and Dread
Some intuitively obvious features of human psychology first
deserve attention here. We know that people, with the exception of
44. See Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 122 (discussing trust arrangements).
45. Id. at 130-31 (discussing insurance trusts).
46. Louis Kaplow makes the following observation about people's failure to take
advantage of the tax savings available through inter vivos gift opportunities: "[A]lthough
some of this behavior can be explained on rational grounds, the evidence seems to suggest
that a good deal of it cannot (or at least not in a straightforward manner that would be
consistent with the standard models of transfer behavior)." Kaplow, supra note 4, at 201.
47. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944-45.
48. See Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis,
in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 91, 92 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991) (adding "self
control," "mental accounting," and "framing" to the standard life-cycle account).
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the clinically depressed, routinely maintain unrealistically optimistic
outlooks on a broad range of questions.49 Not only are people likely
to overestimate the occurrence of positive outcomes, but they also
systematically underestimate the possibility that they will fall victim
to all sorts of ills, such as diseases and accidents."0 To the extent
people count backwards from their anticipated deaths to begin estate
tax liability reduction activities (such as taking advantage of annual
tax-free gifts), an overly optimistic outlook about the date of death
could delay these reduction activities. Empirical work suggests that
people's subjective life expectancies do exceed their actual life
expectancies somewhat, yet the amount of overestimation observed
ranged from roughly one to two and a half years, on average.51 While
this amount of overestimation seems insufficient to account for much
of the underutilization of tax-reducing gift-giving, it is possible that
individuals maintain an even higher degree of optimism with respect
to the question of whether they will die in the near-term (say, within
the next three to five years). 2 Thus, an optimistic conviction that
49. See, e.g., SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-
DECEPTION AND THE HEALTHY MIND 32 (1989) ("We seem to be optimistic by nature,
some of us more than others, but most more than reality can support."); id. at 212-13
("Clearly, the depressed person is lacking in the positive illusions that most people
hold.... [T]he mildly depressed appear to have more accurate views of themselves, the
world, and the future than do normal people.").
50. See Jolls, supra note 4, at 1659-61; Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about
Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806,810 tbl.1 (1980).
51. See Daniel Hamermesh, Expectations, Life Expectancy, and Economic Behavior,
100 Q. J. ECON. 389, 404-06 (1985) (presenting results suggesting that people subjectively
expect to live somewhat longer than actuarial tables would indicate). Hamermesh's study
involved two samples, one from a group of white male economists, and another from a
telephone directory in a mid-sized midwestern Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
(SMSA) (from which white male responses were used); each sample was divided into age
subgroups. The largest variance was found among the 20-39 age group from the SMSA
sample (the mean subjective life expectancy was 75.81, and the actuarial life expectancy
was 73.24); the smallest variance was found among the 40-65 age group from the
economist sample (the mean subjective life expectancy was 76.41, and the actuarial life
expectancy was 75.47). Id. at 394 tbl.II. Hamermesh posits that people may be "updating"
the actuarial tables by incorporating new information about longevity or extrapolating
from past longevity increases, id. at 393, but concludes that people "tend to be more
optimistic about their longevity than extrapolation of the past forty years of improvements
in the U.S. life tables suggests they should be." Id. at 400.
52. Indeed, the objective chances of dying in the very near term are relatively small
for most people. For example, a seventy-year-old who consulted a recent Life Table for
the United States Population would learn that only about 2.5% of her age cohort will
expire in the coming year. Robert N. Anderson, United States Life Tables, 1998, NAT'L
VITAL STAT. REP., Feb. 7, 2001, at 7 tbl.1 ("Life Table for the Total Population: United
States, 1998"), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_18.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Upon attaining the age of seventy-one, that individual
would learn that the odds of surviving the following year would still exceed 97%. Id.
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there is always plenty of time remaining in which to make any
necessary inter vivos transfers of wealth may help explain low levels
of inter vivos giving.
The discounting of future costs53 could interact with optimism to
further entrench procrastination in carrying out estate tax reduction
activities. If optimism operated to push back the subjective date of
death, this might cause people to discount their eventual estate tax
burden excessively. 4  It is also possible that people discount
excessively or in anomalous ways, independent of their optimism.5
For example, there is some support for the notion that people
discount hyperbolically, such that they "have a strong preference for
the present compared to all future dates, but are much less concerned
with the relative importance of future dates."56 In other words, the
fact that the estate tax burden is delayed may matter more than how
much it is delayed (or how much it is perceived as being delayed).
For someone discounting hyperbolically, that the burden is not
occurring in the present time is the single most salient fact in
determining how heavily to discount it. This might also explain why a
person might, in Year 1, plan to begin undertaking estate tax
reduction activities in Year 2, only to find upon the arrival of Year 2
that an even later date, Year 3, now appears preferable as a beginning
date for inter vivos gift-giving.57
These odds may be deemed so small as to be unworthy of sustained attention and
insufficient to trigger immediate tax avoidance efforts. Only when one reaches age eighty-
six do the odds of dying in the coming year exceed 10%. Id. Of course, while death in any
given year is relatively unlikely (given that one has survived the previous year), death in
some year is a certainty.
53. Discounting is something in which our purely rational actor would accurately
engage. See, e.g., THALER, supra note 22, at 93 (according to economic theory, "people
should discount money streams at the (after-tax) market rate of interest").
54. The extent to which life expectancies actually influence discount rates in the
context of a tax triggered by death is empirically unknown. It has been hypothesized that
people do factor in life expectancies in balancing present consumption against future
consumption. Irving Fisher counted "expectation of life" as one of several factors
influencing time preferences, and hypothesized that people whose lives were constantly at
risk and who were without dependents, such as unmarried soldiers and sailors, would
exhibit high degrees of "impatience." IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 81, 87
(1930).
55. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 202 (discussing the possibility that "individuals may
behave myopically, greatly discounting the future"); see also THALER, supra note 22, at
92-106 (discussing anomalies in discounting).
56. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 25 (2000).
57. See id. at 29 (describing a parallel scenario, in which a person first chooses in Year
1 to consume half of a lump sum of money and to spread the balance evenly over the rest
of his lifetime, but then finds in Year 2 that he now prefers to spend half of the remaining
balance and spread the remainder over the rest of his lifetime).
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Significantly, the taxpayer never incurs an immediate "tax price"
in choosing not to make a gift. Indeed, the true "tax price" associated
with a given deferral is not at all clear; it will depend on how much
longer the individual lives, as well as on the timing and quantity of
future gifts. Each successive choice to wait a little while longer to
begin a program of inter vivos transfers may have minimal tax
repercussions on its own, although in the aggregate, these choices
come with a heavy tax price attached.58 Because the price tag is never
directly confronted, and because there is no particular moment at
which a failure to give a particular gift decisively imposes a future
cost, deferral of giving appears more attractive. 9
An additional reason that people may delay beginning estate tax
liability reduction activities is that such activities require
contemplating one's own death and preparing for it in a particularly
concrete way that might run counter to one's interests were one to
continue living. While many people prepare wills and buy life
insurance, both activities that require some cognizance of death,"
these activities may be perceived as fully compatible with continued
life for an indefinite period of time. Dispersing one's assets in
preparation for death is likely perceived differently. Maintaining
control over assets is consistent with continuing to exercise power and
authority in this life; dispersing assets suggests abdication of that
power and authority and capitulation to death.61
People in general, and perhaps well-off people in particular,
experience relatively low levels of "death anxiety" as measured by
58. See SHOUP, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that a donor who fails to give inter vivos
out of a desire to preserve capital "probably fails to consider adequately the 'accruing'
liabilities against his capital in the form of the approaching death tax").
59. In contrast, a periodic wealth tax would squarely confront the taxpayer with the
tax price of continuing to hold wealth.
60. Montaigne suggested that people were likely to put off making wills as a result of
their dread of death: "No wonder that [ordinary people] often get caught in a trap. You
can frighten them by simply mentioning death; and since it is mentioned in wills, never
expect them to draw one up before the doctor has pronounced the death-sentence."
MICHELE DE MONTAIGNE, THE COMPLETE ESSAYS 93 (M.A. Screech trans., Penguin
1991), quoted in ELSTER, supra note 56, at 18 n.48. But see Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Lawyer as Will Maker, 5 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 87, 91 (1982) ("What seems to have
happened more recently is that death and will making have been separated. Each
successive study of probate records shows that the time between the making of the typical
will and the death of the testator grows longer." (citation omitted)).
61. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 2, lines 36-40 (Stephen Orgel
ed., Penguin 1999) (1606) ("Know that we have divided/ in three our kingdom; and 'tis our
fast intent/ To shake all cares and business from our age,/ Conferring them on younger
strengths, while we/ Unburthen'd crawl toward death."); Susan Snyder, King Lear and the
Psychology of Dying, 33 SHAKESPEARE Q. 449, 455 (1982) ("For all the King's vigor and
authority, he is clearly entering a terminal phase.").
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standard psychological instruments.62 Nor do death anxiety levels
appear to go up in old age.63 While it is difficult to know what mix of
cognitive strategies explains these low levels of death anxiety, one
possibility is that denial and evasion feature centrally."4 If so, people
may be reluctant to engage in the sort of forthright confrontation with
mortality that a plan of systematically transferring assets entails.65 In
addition, people typically desire to arrange matters so that there is
improvement in their lives over time.' A dispersal of one's wealth,
which carries with it the implicit message that things are winding
down, seems to run counter to that desire.67
62. See ROBERT KASTENBAUM, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEATH 113 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing the "Death Anxiety Scale," a frequently used measure of death anxiety).
Kastenbaum explains that if we view the scale scores as accurate reflections of actual
death anxiety "we probably should conclude that most normal adults experience only low
to moderate levels." Id. at 117. Moreover, "[t]here are some weak indications that people
in favorable socioeconomic circumstances report relatively lower levels of death anxiety."
Id. at 130.
63. Based on available evidence, "[v]irtually no support can be found for the
proposition that elderly adults live with an elevated sense of fear, anxiety, or distress
centering on the prospect of their mortality." Id. at 123. However, as Kastenbaum notes,
the studies reporting these findings are "cross-sectional" rather than longitudinal, meaning
that the surveyors are tapping into the responses of different people living in the same
time period rather than comparing the responses of the same people as they age. Id. This
methodological feature could call the results into question if we believe that different
generations of individuals experience different levels of death anxiety.
64. See id. at 128 (discussing study responses of elderly respondents). Kastenbaum
observes that "[i]gnoring, evading, and escaping death-related topics were more common
strategies than out-and-out anxiety. Is it possible, then, that what might pass as serenity
should be understood instead as denial? ... An elderly individual may not be ready to
make death his or her number one concern." Id.
65. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 4, at 201 ("[I]t is often suggested that many donors
are uneasy about contemplating their own death and that this unease may affect their
transfer behavior."); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
825, 863 (2001) (noting that "death, which is the triggering event for the estate tax, is
something that most people spend the majority of their lives denying" (citation omitted));
cf. Fried, supra note 22, at 654 ("One also suspects that many people feel a strong aversion
to annuitizing their wealth, arising in part from an unwillingness to face the prospect of old
age and death 'rationally.' ").
66. See Jon Elster & George Loewenstein, Utility from Memory and Anticipation, in
CHOICE OVER TIME 213, 231-33 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992)
(discussing the existence of "a strong incentive to build improvement over time into one's
plans"); id. at 233 (presenting an example that shows how this desire might be manifested
in "[m]isers and children who store away their Halloween candy until it goes stale"); see
also THALER, supra note 22, at 101-02 (discussing the "preference for a rising
consumption profile" as exhibited in experiments where subjects chose to have a less-
preferred dinner at an earlier date than a more-preferred dinner (citing George
Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and
Interpretation (Russell Sage Found., working paper, 1989)).
67. See SHOUP, supra note 3, at 23 (observing that "[a]nyone in good health and
spirits has a normal resistance to acting as if he were to die soon").
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2. Disjunction Effects
We know from observation and intuition that people are often
unable to make decisions about the future while the outcome of some
other pending event is still unknown. Surprisingly, there is empirical
work suggesting that this is true even in cases where the decision-
maker would take exactly the same course of action regardless of the
outcome of that pending event.68 Even when decision-makers could
determine an unambiguously desirable course of action by analyzing
the various branches of the decision tree before them, many of them
do not do so. 69 Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir examined this
phenomenon, which they termed "the disjunction effect," in a study
that posed the choice of whether to purchase a vacation to Hawaii
after an important test." They found that most people would pay to
delay making a decision about the trip until they could learn whether
the test had been passed or failed, even though most people would
make exactly the same decision about the trip upon learning they had
passed as they would upon learning they had failed.7 Tversky and
Shafir explain these results as follows: Because the reasons for taking
the vacation will be different in the "pass" condition than in the "fail"
condition-in the former, it is a celebration, while in the latter it is a
consolation-uncertainty about the test's outcome clouds people's
decision-making.72 Lacking a clear reason to take the vacation,
people were willing to pay to delay the choice until after the outcome
68. See Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under
Uncertainty, 3 PSYCHOL. SCi. 305 passim (1992) [hereinafter Tversky & Shafir, The
Disjunction Effect] (describing their empirical work); see also Eldar Shafir & Amos
Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449 (1992) [hereinafter Shafir & Tversky, Thinking Through
Uncertainty] (further discussing the results of the study).
69. Shafir & Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty, supra note 68, at 469 (explaining
that people may not wish to make the assumptions involved in considering each branch of
the decision tree, may find it hard to focus on various branches simultaneously, or "may
lack the motivation to traverse the tree simply because they presume, as is often the case,
that the problem will not be resolved by separately evaluating the branches").
70. Tversky & Shafir, The Disjunction Effect, supra note 68, at 305-06.
71. Different groups of subjects were used to study responses to the disjunctive choice
(where the test outcome was unknown) than were used to study the choices made under
the "pass" and "fail" conditions. Presumably this method was used to keep the purpose of
the study from becoming transparent to the subjects. Because the same group of subjects
was used for both the "pass" and "fail" conditions, it was possible to see how many would
choose to purchase the vacation in either event (about two-thirds of the subjects made the
same choice whether or not to purchase the vacation, regardless of the test's outcome).
Among the separate group of subjects given the disjunctive choice, sixty percent said they
would be willing to pay a fee to wait on the test outcome. See id.
72. Id. at 306.
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of the test was revealed, even if this additional increment of
information would have no actual impact on their decision.73
Tversky and Shafir found the same effect in a second study
where subjects were asked to imagine they had just taken a gamble
with fifty-fifty odds, in which they had either won $200 or lost $100."4
The subjects were then asked to decide whether to take a second
(imaginary) gamble having precisely the same odds and payoffs as the
first. Where the outcome of the first gamble was not revealed, most
people rejected the second gamble, including about two-thirds of
those who accepted the second gamble both upon learning they had
won the first gamble and upon learning they had lost the first
gamble.75 Again, Tversky and Shafir's hypothesis relates to the
subjects' reasons for taking the second gamble. In the event the
person is "up" $200, the second gamble is a "no lose" proposition
when considered together with the first gamble. No matter the
outcome of the second gamble, the person will not walk away with
less money than she had when she began gambling. Given the
positive expected value of the gamble, many people will take the bet.
Where the person is "down" $100, the second gamble provides a way
of recouping losses, and is attractive for that reason. Because the
reasons for gambling in the two different situations vary, people may
reject the second gamble in the "uncertainty" situation because they
lack a good reason to take it.1
6
How might this relate to estate tax liability reduction? The
Tversky and Shafir study underscores the fact that people often need
to know their reasons for a particular decision before they can carry it
out; simply knowing (or being able to figure out through
introspection) that it is the "right" decision under all imaginable
circumstances is not enough.7 It is easy to imagine how this might
73. Id. In the study, the individual could defer making a decision about the vacation
package until the results of the test were known by paying a five dollar nonrefundable fee.
Id. at 305. That the cost of deferring the decision was small relative to the cost of the
vacation package may have significantly contributed to the results, but rational actors
should be unwilling to pay anything to defer a decision pending the receipt of additional
information, if the additional information will have no impact on the decision.
74. Id. at 306.
75. Id. at 306-07. In this study, the same group of subjects responded to the
disjunctive and the "win" and "lose" versions so that it was possible to identify the number
of individuals who were actually violating the "sure-thing" principle. To keep the
phenomenon under investigation from becoming transparent to the subjects, the various
versions were administered one week apart from each other and were embedded within
sets of other similar problems. See id. at 306.
76. Id. at 307.
77. Id. at 305-07.
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play out in the inter vivos giving context. For example, a wealthy
couple might want their children to enjoy their wealth, whether the
children grow up to be successful professionals or starving artists,
whether the children enjoy good luck or bad luck in various areas,
whether the children marry, divorce, or stay single, and whether the
children have children of their own or not. Yet the wealthy couple's
reasons for wanting their children to have their wealth might vary
depending on these factors-perhaps the gift would be celebratory in
one case and compensatory in another. Unable to formulate reasons
for undertaking a pattern of giving, the parents may delay giving.
To be sure, if the parents could focus on one overarching
"reason" for giving under any and all circumstances-that of
minimizing estate tax liability-the changing events on the horizon
would not matter. But giving is a social act that takes place within a
framework of human relationships, and the personal circumstances of
the donees will be difficult for a donor to ignore. These personal
circumstances relate to the utility associated with the wealth transfer
and should be expected to influence the behavior of even a purely
rational actor. What the disjunction effect adds to the story is this:
Even where that rational actor could, through introspection, discover
a course of giving that would be desirable under all imaginable future
circumstances, the noise and confusion added to the situation by
uncertainty may keep the actor from undertaking that course. This
effect might well combine with excessive optimism and dread of death
to generate substantial procrastination in conceiving and
implementing estate tax liability reduction plans.
3. Loss Aversion and Regret Avoidance
Another reason people may be reluctant to implement inter
vivos giving plans relates to the cognitive phenomenon of loss
aversion. Cognitive work suggests that people do not view a loss of
current holdings as the equivalent of a failure to obtain a gain of the
same amount.78 For example, people will be more upset about losing
$500 than they would be if they had failed to obtain the same $500 in
the first place. This is true even though the two situations should be
deemed economically equivalent. Likewise, people more greatly
regret losses that follow action than they do losses that follow
78. See Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Decision Making, in 3 AN INVITATION TO
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THINKING 77, 85 (Edward E. Smith & Daniel N. Osherson eds., 2d
ed. 1995).
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inaction.79 For example, one study showed that people attribute more
regret to an actor who moves his stocks from investment A to
investment B and subsequently loses money than they would
attribute to the same actor if he left his stocks in investment A and
thereafter lost money relative to what he would have achieved had he
switched to investment B.8' The difference between the amount of
regret produced by action and inaction, respectively, helps explain
why people tend to exhibit a status quo bias.8'
The relationship between these phenomena and lifetime wealth
retention is fairly straightforward. A decision to undertake an inter
vivos gift is a gamble of sorts; it could indeed save one's children from
paying estate taxes, but it might also have the effect of alienating
needed resources and control during one's life. If one makes the
decision to convey inter vivos and subsequently runs out of money as
a result of an unexpectedly long life or unexpectedly heavy
expenditures, one's sense of regret is likely to be enormous. On the
other hand, failing to make the conveyance might well be perceived
merely as the failure to secure a gain for one's children. While this
too might turn out to be a "mistake" in some objective sense, it is not
the sort of mistake that results in a loss from one's present-day
benchmark; rather, it is a failure to improve matters for loved ones.
If failing to make the conveyance turns out to be a mistake, the
error will only become manifest after the end of the would-be
conveyer's life. Foreseeing the possibility of the non-conveyance
turning out to have been a mistake might cause the potential
79. See, e.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 38 (1988) (discussing the possible role of "regret
avoidance" in explaining the bias people exhibit in favor of maintaining the status quo
over making a risky choice that has the same expected value).
80. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 608, 657-58 (1998) (discussing this study and citing Daniel Kahneman,
Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 375, 388-89 (Neal J. Roese & James M.
Olson eds., 1995)).
81. Robert Scott observed that:
when the prospects of either gain or loss are equally probable, individuals weight
the anticipated cost of regret more heavily than the corresponding benefit of
pride.... All other things being equal, individuals are thus reluctant to make
choices in which they feel responsible for the outcomes. As a consequence,
individuals are often motivated not to choose.
Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the
Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 329, 340 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also THALER, supra note 22, at 73 (discussing
how the "asymmetry between omission and commission" bears on levels of blame and
regret experienced in the event of an unfavorable outcome, and explaining how behavior
might be affected by "the anticipation of blame and regret").
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conveyer some anticipatory regret, but regret over an imagined
posthumous determination that one's nonconveyance was a mistake is
likely much milder than that which would be experienced if the inter
vivos conveyance proved to be a mistake (a state of affairs that would
become known during one's own lifetime). If, as has been posited,
people will often defer decision-making in order to avoid the
particularly painful sort of regret that follows from taking actions that
turn out to be wrong, this could lead people to defer making inter
vivos conveyances.
This effect might be strengthened by the fact that people
considering making such inter vivos conveyances often do so in
consultation with a professional, such as an attorney, who is typically
predisposed to take a highly risk-averse approach.82 Even if the
attorney herself would feel no worse about counseling her client to
make an affirmative decision that turns out to be bad than she would
in counseling inaction that ends up resulting in a greater-than-
necessary estate tax burden, she recognizes that the two kinds of
mistakes are not equivalent from the client's perspective. If the
attorney strongly counsels her client to make a conveyance and the
client later comes to believe this was a mistake, the attorney will be
blamed. If, on the other hand, the attorney does little to overcome
her client's instincts to hold onto the money, and this has the effect of
depriving the heirs or devisees of some potential estate tax savings, it
is unlikely that the attorney will ever be directly blamed for this.
After all, she was only carrying out her client's wishes. The only time
the client will perceive that the attorney's advice was bad is in the
event the client is counseled to convey inter vivos and later comes to
regret it.
83
It is also possible that risk aversion about financial matters
increases with age. ' Richard Posner has suggested that this might
occur because as one ages, more of one's wealth is held in financial
rather than human capital; older people often do not have the ability
to earn wages to cover any losses they encounter.85 Hence while
82. For a general discussion of how the dynamic of the attorney-client relationship
might foster excessive caution on the part of attorneys, see Donald C. Langevoort &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal
Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 377-78 (1997).
83. Cf. id. (explaining that clients cannot tell whether an attorney was excessively
cautious in advising the client to forgo deals or undertake them with unnecessary
precaution; the only mistakes a client can detect are those arising out of insufficient
attorney caution which results in a problem for the client).
84. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 117 (1995).
85. Id.
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people are naturally optimistic, they may become less optimistic with
age and experience.8 6  This could lead to an interesting life-cycle
pattern: When people are relatively young and more optimistic, they
may defer making inter vivos gifts because it seems unnecessary.
They may reason that there will always be time later to do so, or they
may wish to wait on the outcome of intervening events. Later, as
people age, the optimism may to some extent be displaced by risk
aversion with respect to finances, with the result that no transfers are
made even when one begins to take more seriously the prospect of
mortality.87
4. Mental Accounting and Inexperience
Mental accounting may also reinforce a reluctance to give inter
vivos. People tend to construct rules and habits of thought to guide
their financial dealings, often substituting "brightline" rules, like
"never spend principal," for more nuanced calculations designed to
maximize wealth in each particular case.m In other words, rather than
treating all funds as fungible, people might exhibit a far greater
reluctance to spend assets than to spend current income.89 Whether
or not particular funds are "coded" as savings or as income will often
determine how and when those funds are spent.90 To the extent that
donors perceive gifts as a form of "spending" and the funds
transferred as part of their "principal," giving an inter vivos gift might
violate a powerfully-held and deeply-internalized belief about how
money is to be handled.9 ' In cases where the donor attributes his
successful accumulation and retention of wealth to stringent lifetime
compliance with this particular rule about money, the resistance to
violating it may be even stronger.
The tendency to stick to tried-and-true financial principles
highlights another possible reason why people might not respond as
86. Id. at 105 ("Experience and age are positively correlated, so that the effect of
experience in grinding down natural but exaggerated optimism would be to make the old
more pessimistic than the young.").
87. Carl Shoup suggests that the onset of senile dementia may also play a role in some
cases. See SHOUP, supra note 3, at 22-23 (describing the interplay of aversion to
contemplating death on the one hand, and senility on the other, as follows: "The first
factor postpones until tomorrow the decision on giving, and the second makes it less likely
that tomorrow will be the day of decision.").
88. See Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 48, at 95-193 (discussing use of such rules).
89. See id. at 96-98 (explaining this mental accounting system).
90. See id. at 101-02 (presenting a theory that assumes "different sources of income
are encoded into different mental accounts").
91. See SHOUP, supra note 3, at 23-24 (discussing the "somewhat irrational dislike for
consuming one's capital" that seems to inhibit inter vivos giving).
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expected to the estate tax: their lack of experience with it. In other
contexts, studies have demonstrated that lack of direct experience
with a particular phenomenon may yield suboptimal precautions with
regard to that phenomenon. For example, many people living in
flood-prone areas will not voluntarily purchase flood insurance unless
they have had a flood or know someone who has had a flood.9"
Death, the trigger for the estate tax, is a once-in-a-lifetime affair. As
a result, people have little opportunity to directly learn, through
experience, about the negative consequences of a failure to avoid the
tax. In this respect, the estate tax is different than an annual or other
periodic tax, in which unhappy experiences involving taxes paid in
one period might spur avoidance behaviors in a later period. The
possibility that people adjust their tax avoidance behaviors in
response to direct experience with a particular tax, rather than simply
in response to expected tax liability, is an intriguing one that deserves
study.93
To be sure, death, unlike a flood, is an event that is certain to
occur to any given individual eventually. However, death in any
given year carries a relatively low probability,9" and taxpayers' lack of
personal experience with estate tax burdens might lead them to
overestimate their ability to avoid the burden through future planning
or giving activities. Having never had the personal experience of
being "caught short" by the estate tax, people may fail to fully
appreciate the implications of their failure to mitigate liability
through giving. Still, the analogy is an imperfect one. People often
estimate probabilities of given events based on the ease with which
examples of the event come to mind, a phenomenon known as
92. See Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB.
POL'Y 227, 243-44 (1976) (discussing the link between a person's experience with a
particular loss, such as a flood, and the steps she is likely to take to avoid the loss).
Kunreuther also used survey data to investigate whether the anticipation of federal aid
might be responsible for individuals' failure to purchase insurance against hazards such as
floods and earthquakes. Id. at 236. Although almost two-thirds of the uninsured
respondents in flood- and earthquake-prone areas indicated that they did not expect any
assistance from the federal government in the event of a flood or earthquake, id., it is
nevertheless possible that expectation of relief from private or public sources contributes
to the behavior. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its
Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1996) (discussing the potential connection
between disaster relief and decisions not to purchase insurance).
93. The possibility that experience may play an important cognitive role in learning
and decision-making is explored in W. Bentley MacLeod, Cognition and the Theory of
Learning by Doing, USC Olin Research Paper No. 11-11 (USC, March 2000), at
http://cfg.ucla.edu/ccpe/000407/macleod.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
94. See supra note 52 (discussing the probability of death in a given year as reflected
in longevity tables).
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"availability."9  In other words, one reason people fail to deal
appropriately with possibilities with which they have little experience
is because these possibilities simply never make it onto their "radar
screen."96 Given the media attention devoted to the estate tax, it is
likely to be "available" to taxpayers in at least a general way. This
availability makes the estate tax distinguishable from events that
literally fail to cross people's minds.
One might further object that taxpayers have the opportunity to
gain experience with the estate tax when family members die. Yet
this will not always be the case. The estate tax contains an unlimited
marital deduction, so that transfers to the surviving spouse are not
taxed at all.' This means that the later-to-die spouse typically will not
have had the experience of paying taxes on his spouse's estate. Of
course, children of the wealthy may gain some experience with the tax
in settling the estates of their parents, and this experience might
shape their own estate tax reduction behavior. However, the estate
tax landscape might change substantially enough during the
intervening years to keep the experience from being directly
applicable. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to find out whether
there is more inter vivos giving observed among people who have
themselves been beneficiaries of estates subject to the estate tax. This
might help us determine whether lack of experience has any
independent bearing on behavioral results.
Clearly, both rational and behavioral explanations support the
observed robust preferences for lifetime wealth retention. Before
drawing policy implications from the foregoing analysis, however, I
wish to turn to the second of the puzzles identified at the outset-the
surprising unpopularity of the tax.
II. THE PUZZLE OF POPULAR OPPOSITION
We might expect the estate tax to be a popular tax, from the
standpoint of rational self-interest. The great majority of Americans
do not leave behind estates large enough to trigger estate tax
liability.98 Indeed, the estate tax imposes liability on only about two
95. Kunreuther, supra note 92, at 243.
96. See id. at 244 (discussing the link between "the concept of awareness of actual or
anticipated loss" and "past experience with the hazard").
97. I.R.C. § 2056 (Lexis 2001); see Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, Unnecessary
Estate Tax Returns: Removing the Residue of the 'Widow's Tax,' 94 TAX NOTES 235, 235
(2002) (discussing the unlimited marital deduction and observing that "about six out of
seven returns filed by the estates of married decedents show no estate tax liability at all").
98. Each decedent's estate is entitled to a unified credit which effectively exempts a
certain amount of wealth from estate and gift taxation. See I.R.C. § 2010 (Lexis 2001).
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percent of estates.99 As long as the money collected from this two
percent is not entirely dissipated by the government, the funds
collected make the other ninety-eight percent net winners. By
reducing the overall tax burden that the ninety-eight percent must
bear for a given menu of governmentally-provided benefits, the tax
effectuates a wealth transfer from a small and very wealthy minority
to the rest of the population. This ought to be appealing to the large
majority receiving the transfer.
Yet apparently it is not. The estate tax seems to be very
unpopular." Not only has it fared poorly in opinion polls, but the
political will to abolish it has been recently exercised. As a
preliminary matter, we must ask whether these indicators fairly
reflect majoritarian preferences. We might well question whether
opinion polls provide a valid measure of public sentiment, especially
given their susceptibility to "framing" manipulations."1  And,
applying public choice analysis, we might also question whether the
political results achieved in Congress actually line up with
For decedents dying in 1998, the exemption amount was $625,000; in 1999, the exemption
increased to $650,000; and in 2000 and 2001, it increased to $675,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2010
(2000) (amended version at I.R.C. § 2010 (Lexis 2001)). Decedents dying in 2002 have an
exemption of $1 million, and the exemption will increase in steps thereafter, to reach a
high of $3.5 million in 2009, before the estate tax is repealed in 2010 (subject to sunset
provisions which, in the absence of further congressional action, would bring the tax back
in 2011 with an exemption of $1 million). See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 501,511,
521, 901, 115 Stat. 38, 69-72, 150 (June 7, 2001).
99. In 1998, 47,483 taxable estate tax returns were filed, representing about 2.1% of
adult deaths (over age 20) the previous year. See William G. Gale and Joel Slemrod,
Overview, in RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 1, 8 tbls.1-2 (presenting Internal Revenue
Service data on estate tax returns filed in 1998); id. at 7-9 (observing that the total number
of estate tax returns in 1998 constituted 4.3% of the number of adult deaths in 1997, and
that about 49% of these returns were taxable). Comparing the number of adult deaths in
one year with the number of taxable returns filed in the following year yields only a rough
approximation of the percentage of deaths generating taxable returns, as most (but not all)
estate tax returns are filed in the year following death. See Internal Revenue Service,
STAT. INCOME BULL., at tbl. 17 n.2 (Spring 2001) ("Estate Tax Returns as a Percentage of
Adult Deaths, Selected Years of Death 1934-1996") (explaining this point), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/estate/deaths.cfm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). The most recent IRS data tracing estate tax returns by year of death
indicates that 1.79% of adult deaths in 1996 generated taxable estate tax returns. Id.
100. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944 ("[Glift and estate taxes and other
forms of wealth transfer taxes, such as inheritance ones, appear to be very unpopular. In
polls, people consistently oppose these taxes, and approve reductions in them."); Glenn
Kessler & Dan Morgan, Some Want to Keep the 'Death Tax' Alive, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,
2001, at A8 ("[P]olls indicate broad support for eliminating the estate tax.").
101. See Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth
Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363, 396-97
(1996).
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majoritarian preferences. 2 However, the fact that both opinion polls
and political results point to the estate tax's unpopularity suggests
that, at a minimum, the estate tax suffers from a life-threatening case
of bad public relations.
While most taxpayers readily express blanket resentment of all
taxes to which they are actually subjected, the estate tax appears to be
a unique example of a tax that is widely opposed even by people who
have had no direct experience with it and no objective reason to
believe that such direct experience will be forthcoming. Why is this
so?
A. Rational Explanations for Opposition
Rational self-interest and standard economic analysis can
account for at least some proportion of the observed opposition to
the estate tax. Many individuals whose estates do not end up being
taxable nonetheless make decisions under the shadow of the estate
tax, and others who have no expectation of having taxable estates
may nevertheless have cogent and rational reasons for their
opposition. I will explore these rational bases for estate tax
opposition in this subpart.
102. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991) (providing an overview and critique of the
"economic theory of legislation," which suggests that legislators are driven by their
interest in reelection to respond to economically-motivated constituents or interest group
pressures); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (discussing interest group theory, which posits that
"certain groups enjoy organizational advantages that enable them to exercise
'disproportionate' influence on politicians and regulators and thus secure laws favoring
their interests even when those laws injure large groups with diffuse interests (e.g., the
general public) and impose a net loss on society" (citation omitted)).
103. Sixty percent of those surveyed in a June 2000 Gallup poll supported repeal of the
federal estate tax; about one-sixth of the respondents believed they would personally
benefit from the repeal. Scott Bernard Nelson, A Federal Tax With One Foot in the Grave,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2000, at C1. A previous poll elicited broad support for
increasing the estate tax exemption amounts. See Edward J. McCaffery, Grave Robbers:
The Moral Case Against the Death Tax, 85 TAx NOTES 1429, 1440 (1999) (citing a 1997
Pew Research Center survey in which 79% of those surveyed favored a gradual increase in
the unified credit to $1 million). By comparison, a recent Gallup poll indicates that 74%
of Americans support a reduction in federal income taxes. Wendy W. Simmons, Public
Has Mixed Feelings About Tax Cuts, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 24, 2001, at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010124.asp (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); cf. Ascher, supra note 31, at 75 (noting that 64% of California voters voted to
repeal the state inheritance tax, which affected only the wealthiest five to ten percent).
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1. Assessing the Impact of the Estate Tax
As a starting point, it is worth scrutinizing the much-cited two
percent figure."° Simply counting taxable estates (the way the two
percent figure is apparently derived)"5 undercounts those who are
directly affected by the estate tax. For example, because of the estate
tax's unlimited marital deduction, bequests to a surviving spouse are
not taxed. °6 Thus, for a typical wealthy couple, only the second-to-
die spouse will leave behind a taxable estate. Nevertheless, we would
expect both spouses to rationally view themselves as having estates
that are "subject to the estate tax."'0 7 Similarly, if a person takes
actions to avoid estate tax liability altogether, perhaps incurring great
utility losses to do so, her estate will not show up as taxable."8
In addition, some people whose estates are not ultimately subject
to the tax may nevertheless pass through a window of time (perhaps
in early retirement) during which their estates would be subject to the
tax if they were to die immediately. 9 The estate tax doubtless causes
them disutility because it decreases the expected value of their estate
104. The fact that estate tax liability is imposed on only about two percent of estates
appears in virtually every news article treating the subject, as well as in many scholarly
treatments. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944.
105. See supra note 99.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. To get a clearer picture of the estate tax's impact, we must look at both taxable
and nontaxable estate tax returns. Executors are required to file a federal estate tax
return whenever the gross estate, after adjustment for taxable gifts, exceeds the applicable
exemption amount. I.R.C. § 6018 (Lexis 2001). William Gale and Joel Slemrod found
that the number of estate tax returns filed in 1998 represented about 4.3% of adult deaths
in 1997. See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 99, at 7-9. However, approximately 51% of
these returns were nontaxable, largely as a result of deductions such as the marital
deduction. Id. As Gale and Slemrod explain, "[b]equests to surviving spouses account for
between 60 and 75 percent of all deductions in each estate size category." Id. at 9.
108. See Leonard E. Burman, Estate Taxes and the Angel of Death Loophole, 76 TAX
NOTES 675, 676 (1997) (observing that statistics on taxable estates "understate the burden
of estate taxes" and that "[pIresumably many people avoid paying tax on their estates, but
the costs of avoiding the tax represent an implicit tax"); Edward J. McCaffery & Richard
E. Wagner, A Bipartisan Declaration of Independence from Death Taxation, 88 TAX
NOTES 801, 805 (2000) ("While only 2 percent of decedents leave an estate large enough
to generate an actual tax paid, many more have planned their way around the tax.").
109. See Poterba, supra note 15, at 342 (pointing out the possibility that "some
households that have enough wealth at the time of the survey to be classified as potential
'estate tax households' will have drawn down their wealth to finance their own
consumption in the years before their death, and that they will no longer be affected by
the estate tax"). Thus, even though more survey respondents anticipate estate tax liability
than will actually end up being liable, see, e.g., Johnston, supra note 40 ("While 17 percent
of Americans in a recent Gallup survey think they will owe estate taxes, in fact only the
richest 2 percent of Americans do."), we cannot necessarily infer that the respondents are
being irrational, given the possibility of shifts in fortune and the undercounting of spouses
discussed above.
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during that window of time. At a minimum, then, we would expect
rational opposition from anyone who at any time in her life has assets
sufficient to incur estate tax liability (or who would have assets
sufficient to incur estate tax liability, but for actions taken expressly
for the purpose of avoiding estate tax liability). Yet even this larger
group (everyone who will ever have assets sufficient to trigger estate
tax liability) does not contain all of our rational estate tax opponents.
That would be the case only if each person knew to a certainty
whether or not she would ever attain sufficient wealth to trigger
estate tax liability. This is obviously not the case.
2. The Role of Uncertainty
The phenomenon of social mobility is real, if frequently
overstated.' People are uncertain about how their holdings will
grow, shrink, or fluctuate over time. They are uncertain about their
own long-term earning potential and that of others in their families.
They are uncertain about the expenses they will incur. They are
uncertain about the timing of their own deaths and those of others.
They are also uncertain about future changes in the estate tax laws
themselves.
To see why all this uncertainty matters, imagine the extreme
situation in which nobody has any idea whether or not her estate will
be subject to the estate tax. In other words, the tax is randomly
imposed (and I am assuming, quite counterfactually, that it could
actually be collected from everyone upon whom it is randomly
imposed). People are aware that two percent of all estates will be
subject to the tax, and they are aware of the average amount of estate
tax liability imposed on that two percent (let us say it is a half million
dollars),"' but they have no idea whether or not they will be among
the taxed two percent. In such a case, the expected value of each
110. For a discussion of the rational underpinnings of the "Prospect of Upward
Mobility," see Roland Benabou & Efe A. Ok, Social Mobility and the Demand for
Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis, 116 Q.J. ECON. 447, 478-79 (2001) (showing how
people might rationally expect upward mobility and oppose redistribution). See also
ALBERTO ALESINA & ELIANA LA FERRARA, PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION IN
THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITIES 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8267, 2001) ("Some of today's poor may become rich tomorrow and-to the extent that
redistributive policies cannot be changed very frequently-they may oppose redistributive
schemes that, although advantageous today, may make them net losers in the future.").
111. This is not an unrealistic figure. See Poterba, supra note 15, at 329 (noting that,
based on 1995 data on the number of federal estate tax returns filed and 1996 data on
revenue collected, "estate taxes per taxpayer average several hundred thousand dollars").
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person's estate would drop by $10,000 ($500,000 * .02) as a result of
the existence of the estate tax.
12
We might think that a large majority would rationally oppose
such a tax, even though few would actually end up being subject to it.
The estate tax in such a case would appear to operate much like a tax
on lottery winnings that is imposed after tickets have been purchased
but before the winning lottery numbers have been announced. All
lottery ticket holders would rationally oppose such a tax, because it
reduces the expected value of their lottery ticket. We would not tell a
lottery ticket holder that she is irrational to oppose the tax simply
because she holds a statistically small chance of winning the pot and
thus is unlikely to suffer from the imposition of the tax."3
Importantly, however, the estate tax will presumably also
generate benefits-e.g., highways, national parks, national defense,
social programs-that will be enjoyed by members of society. If a
rational actor, Amelia, is deciding whether to oppose the estate tax,
she should take into account at least three factors (leaving aside the
cost, if any, of opposing the tax):"
4
L, the expected amount of estate tax liability
P, the probability that the tax will be imposed upon her; and
B, the expected benefits the tax will generate for her."5
Taking these factors into account, Amelia should rationally
support the tax if (L * P) < B. Consider the simple case in which
Amelia's society is made up of one thousand people, twenty of whom
will be subject to the $500,000 estate tax. Thus, revenues of $10
million will be collected, which will then be transformed into benefits
112. In fact, the expected value would drop by different amounts for different
individuals due to discounting, given that different individuals have different expected
remaining life spans and thus different periods of time remaining before imposition of the
tax. But the basic point remains valid.
113. Unless, that is, the time and effort involved in opposing the tax is larger than the
reduction in expected value associated with it.
114. The kind of opposition that typically gets captured in polls is indeed costless or
very nearly so; a person need only answer a question or check a box to register
disapproval of the tax. The costs might even be negative if people get satisfaction out of
opposing the tax. For example, some people might feel better about themselves after
checking the "oppose" box than they did before they encountered the question.
115. One important complication, which I will simply note, is that both L and B ought
to be discounted to present value. Presumably, the stream of benefits will start
immediately for each person and will continue on until that person's death; estate tax
liability will be imposed only at death. Because different people have different expected
life spans, they will have different expected costs associated with the tax in present value
terms, even assuming everyone is equally likely to be taxed. They will also have different
expected lifetime streams of benefits, for the same reason. The simple equations
presented here ignore the problem of discounting entirely.
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to society. We might hope that these benefits are at least as valuable
as the revenues collected. Even though administrative costs will take
a bite out of the revenues and will lower the amount of funds
available to be redistributed in the form of benefits, the government
is presumably also adding value by, for example, solving collective
action problems that would otherwise make a valuable public good
unattainable.
Given the possibility that the margin of benefits over revenues is
small (or perhaps even nonexistent), and the realistic likelihood that a
particular individual might contemplate receiving a somewhat less
than proportionate share of the benefits,"6 a person who has an
exactly random chance of estate tax liability might find it rational to
oppose the tax. But for a substantial majority of the population, the
chances of being subject to the estate tax are far more remote than a
random chance. If the chances that one's estate will be subject to the
estate tax are significantly less than random, and if one still expects to
share proportionately in the benefits, opposition to the tax no longer
makes economic sense. Given the number of people in this position
(that is, who stand a significantly lower-than-random chance of being
subject to the estate tax), we might expect more support for the estate
tax than actually exists.
Nor is the case for supporting the estate tax necessarily
undermined if we imagine that many of those citizens do not
particularly care for the specific benefits that are purchased with the
tax and would prefer not to receive them. We might take those
benefits as a given-a result of a political process in which those
citizens' preferences did not hold sway-and assume that the benefits
must be paid for somehow. If an individual's chances of being
subjected to this tax are lower than they are of being subjected to
another tax that would otherwise be used to fund the benefits, a clear
case for supporting the estate tax would emerge.'17
Could the explanation for popular opposition perhaps be found
in uncertainty about the estate tax laws themselves? Might it be the
116. It will usually be the case in the real world that benefits are not spread equally
among the populace. Exceptions would be expenditures for a true public good like
national defense (which is enjoyed by each person in roughly equal measure), or instances
in which an identical good is provided to each person throughout the whole society (for
example, if everyone in the society were simultaneously given a voucher for a free
inoculation against a particular disease).
117. This assumes that the other tax that might be used to fund the same set of benefits
would be of the same magnitude as the estate tax. This might not be the case. For
example, if one tax were cheaper to administer than the other, a lower tax amount would
fund the same benefits.
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case that people are rationally factoring in the possibility that the
estate tax laws will be changed during their lifetimes to impose
liability on a larger universe of estates or to raise the marginal tax
rates? Either type of change could conceivably alter the expected
cost of the tax for a given individual enough to convert a de minimus
risk of estate tax liability into a more serious one. But if the estate tax
is generating present benefits for an individual (whether in the form
of reduced liability for other kinds of taxes, or in the form of
additional benefits), we would expect her to wait until a change that
would render her estate vulnerable to the tax loomed on the political
horizon before beginning to oppose the tax. This would enable the
actor to enjoy the wealth transfer associated with the current tax
scheme in the meantime."'8
3. Other Rational Explanations
Thus far, I have been assuming that the only reason a person
might rationally oppose the estate tax is if she expected her own
estate to be subject to it. But the central fact about estates is that
they represent assets that are about to be distributed to heirs or
designated beneficiaries. These expectant others might well resent
any curtailing of their bounty, regardless of whether they expected
their own estates at death to exceed the estate tax liability threshold.
However, there is reason to question whether this would be a
significant additional source of estate tax opposition.
The way in which the estate tax presently interacts with the gift
tax could make would-be beneficiaries support a strong estate tax, on
the theory that this would tend to push their benefactors into making
earlier inter vivos gifts instead." 9 Likewise, current recipients of inter
vivos gifts motivated by estate taxation might fear those gifts would
be diminished if the estate tax motivation for them were removed.'20
On the other hand, beneficiaries may be aware of the reluctance of
118. But what if one expected one's ability to express opposition to the tax to be lower
in the future? For example, an elderly person with an estate somewhere below the current
estate tax threshold might fear becoming incapacitated and then being unable to oppose a
ratcheted-up version of the same tax which would reach her estate. Would she not be
better off opposing the tax now even though it does not yet apply to her estate? Yet this
argument proves too much. Even if the estate tax were presently eliminated, it could be
reintroduced later on. Or another form of taxation, even more damaging to one's assets,
might be introduced prior to one's death. In the meantime, the person would be forgoing
the benefits of the wealth transfer implicit in the present form of the tax.
119. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (describing favorable tax treatment
of inter vivos gifts).
120. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that inter vivos gifts drop when bequests are
less heavily taxed. BERNHEIM ET AL., supra note 27, at 3.
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potential donors to part with wealth inter vivos, even when this
results in unnecessary estate tax liability,' 2' and they might rationally
predict that the estate tax will reduce the net benefits they will
receive. They might also fear that their would-be benefactors would
react to an estate tax with consumption or donations to charities,
rather than with inter vivos gifts. 22 Thus it is possible that rationally
expectant beneficiaries account for some of the opposition to the
estate tax.
Another possibility is that people are opposing the estate tax out
of rational ignorance. Perhaps it is simply too expensive to gather the
information that would establish the likelihood that an individual
would be subject to it.'23 If this is the case, opposition might simply be
reflexive, reflecting a distaste for any additional, complicated, and
potentially harmful tax. It is indeed likely that many people who
oppose the estate tax do so without specific knowledge of even the
most basic details about it, such as the threshold at which it kicks in.
2
1
But this information does not seem terribly expensive to acquire
relative to the benefits that could be lost if one erroneously opposed
the tax.22 The reasons that people fail to obtain the information may
have less to do with the costs of acquiring it than with the perceived
irrelevance of it. The fact that it may not be perceived as particularly
relevant suggests that people are doing something more than
crunching through equations and figuring expected values when they
decide whether or not to oppose the estate tax.
Could an explanation for widespread public opposition lurk
instead in a more sophisticated form of rational self-interest?
Perhaps people are familiar with the economic arguments against the
estate tax (e.g., that it will encourage consumption over savings) and
121. See supra Part I.
122. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text (discussing substitutes for inter
vivos giving).
123. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Comments, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME
INEQUALITY 335, 336 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994) (arguing that the public's lack of
knowledge about tax policy is "simply an aspect of 'rational ignorance' " and that it is
rational to remain uninformed "[w]hen information is costly to obtain and retain, and
when that information concerns areas where individuals are not actually making
decisions").
124. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Joel Slemrod, Rhetoric & Economics in the Estate Tax
Debate, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 613, 619 n.5 (2001) (noting that forty-five percent of respondents
in one survey of family-owned businesses said they lacked knowledge of their own estate
tax liability).
125. The recent changes in the estate tax, which alter both exemption amounts and tax
rates over the next nine years, have indeed greatly raised the cost of acquiring this
information. But these complications cannot explain opposition to the estate tax that
preceded these changes.
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have decided on principled grounds to oppose the tax."' Again, this is
possible. But the general public has not often exhibited a patient
interest in probing the economic implications of particular taxation or
spending decisions."' Moreover, were they to do so, they would find
the evidence to be quite mixed.'28
More plausibly, perhaps people are responding empathetically to
the imposition of the estate tax on others, or are responding on
principle to something in the estate tax that offends their values. 9
The argument here would be that the equation presented earlier,
which looked just at the monetary costs and benefits, did not capture
all of the disutility associated with the tax. But the possibility that
people are responding on principled grounds or based on personal
values begs the question of where those principles and values come
from, and answering these antecedent questions requires looking
outside the bounds of the rational actor model.
B. Behavioral Explanations for Opposition
Rational explanations take us some distance in understanding
opposition to the estate tax. However, several features of people's
cognitive apparatus help to further augment our understanding of
popular opposition to the estate tax.
126. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944 (suggesting the possibility that "people do
not like gift and estate taxes for good and legitimate reasons: because such taxes penalize
thrift and capital accumulation, encourage and relatively reward wanton and conspicuous
consumption, run counter to a deep-seated human instinct or intuition to provide for one's
heirs, etc."). See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer
Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Uneasy Case] (discussing
objections to the estate tax).
127. See generally Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax
Policy, in TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY, supra note 123, at 309, 311-15
(discussing the general public's limited knowledge of tax policy). For example, the
corporate income tax is widely supported even though its incidence necessarily falls on
individuals. See id. at 321-24.
128. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Maria G. Perozek, Do Estate Taxes Reduce Saving?,
in RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 216, 235 (explaining that their analysis suggests "the
effects of estate taxes on saving depend crucially on transfer motives; the overall effects
require analysis of both the donor and the potential recipient; and in a surprising number
of cases, higher estate taxes appear to raise savings").
129. See William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular
Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287, 331 (1996) ("Public resistance to
transfer taxation ... may be rooted not in irrational hopes but in value preferences.
Regardless of their own prospects for accumulating wealth, people harbor substantial
misgivings about estate taxation."); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1945 (asking if there might
be "a moral dimension to the factually erroneous identification of most people with estate
tax targets"); McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 287 (suggesting that a form of
"anti-envy" seems to pervade public attitudes about the estate tax).
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1. Excessive Optimism
One explanation frequently offered for the widespread
opposition to the estate tax is that people are unduly optimistic.""
Although few people are objectively justified in expecting to be
subject to the tax, the argument runs, many unrealistically hope to
become wealthy enough to be subject to it. 3' As noted above,
optimism is an important and enduring feature of human
psychology. 13 2 Such optimism has its limits, however, and it might
initially seem a bit implausible that a large proportion of the
population actually operates under the optimistic misimpression that
they are going to become wealthy enough to be subject to the estate
tax. In fact, a recent poll indicated that only seventeen percent of the
people surveyed actually expected to be subject to the tax.'33 Yet
optimism might well interact with some of the strictly rational reasons
for opposing the estate tax to expand the number of. estate tax
opponents significantly.
The equation discussed above' indicated that a person who
thought his odds of being subject to the estate tax were about as good
as those that would be produced by a random lottery system of estate
tax liability might well oppose it. Asking people whether or not they
expect to have net assets exceeding the current exemption amount at
death might draw few positive responses. Yet if we instead ask
people whether they think they have "a better chance than most
other people" of having net assets exceeding that amount at death, we
might get a much larger number of positive responses. People
characteristically believe that they will do better than average on
most measures,'35 and if they were to think about the estate tax in this
way, optimism might combine with uncertainty to produce opposition
130. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 31, at 119 (discussing the possibility that dreams of
sudden wealth explain opposition to wealth transfer taxes); Graetz, supra note 2, at 285
("The only convincing explanation that has occurred to me for this phenomenon lies in the
optimism of the American people."); see also McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944 (discussing
the common explanation that people have a "lottery mentality").
131. People might also be overly optimistic in expecting bequests and fear that an
estate tax could diminish the amount of the bequest. On the other hand, a high estate tax
might trigger more inter vivos giving, which the potential recipient would probably prefer,
so the role of optimism on the part of potential recipients is not clear.
132. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
133. Johnston, supra note 40.
134. See text accompanying supra notes 114-16.
135. See supra notes 49-50.
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to the tax. However, it is uncertain to what extent unrealistic
optimism really extends to predictions about future wealth levels.'36
It is also possible that optimism may play out in smaller ways.
People who pass through a window of time in which their estates are
large enough to be subject to the tax are likely to optimistically
assume that they will enjoy at least that level of wealth until their
deaths, and to disregard the possibility that they will suffer reversals,
such as serious health problems, that will decrease their holdings.'37
Opposition to the estate tax is likely affected by this optimism, to the
extent people fail to factor in the possibility that their holdings will
drop over time so that they would be net gainers, not net losers, as a
result of the tax. Yet optimism alone seems insufficient to explain the
high levels of opposition to the estate tax.'38
2. Framing and Mental Accounting
Empirical work has repeatedly demonstrated that the way in
which a particular question or problem situation is framed can be
outcome determinative. '39 In the case of public goods provision,
framing a particular decision as a choice of whether or not to
contribute to a public good yields more cooperation than does a
136. Compare TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 32-33 ("More than 95 percent of people
questioned in these surveys typically believe that the economic picture will be good for
everyone and that their personal economic future will be even better than that of
others."), with Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 810 tbl.1 (1980) (demonstrating that university
students estimated that they had a better chance than their peers of experiencing a
number of positive events-including liking their postgraduation job, earning a good
starting salary, owning their own home, and living past age eighty-but that their
responses were on balance slightly pessimistic when they were asked to estimate how their
chances compared to those of their peers for earning more than a particular salary figure
ten years hence, and for "marrying someone wealthy").
137. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 4, at 1659 (discussing findings suggesting that people
systematically underestimate the chances that negative events will befall them).
138. Optimism might also play a role in discounting, which would seem to cut in the
other direction. An overly optimistic actor might overestimate the length of time
remaining before death (and hence, before the imposition of the tax) and might discount
excessively as a result. See text accompanying supra notes 51-54. This might lead to an
underestimation of the tax's costs relative to the benefits. But see infra note 162
(explaining that such discounting would not make a difference in a decision to oppose the
estate tax if the tax is not perceived as generating any benefits at all).
139. See, e.g., THALER, supra, note 22, at 75 (discussing different perceptions of
surcharges and discounts); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1874 (describing different reactions
when a merchant offers a cash bonus and a credit surcharge); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, in FOUNDATIONS OF
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 274, 275-76 (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998)
(discussing findings of preference reversals when a frame is shifted from choices regarding
the number of people who will survive to the number of people who will die).
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frame that asks people to decide whether or not to forgo consumption
of a private good to avoid negative side effects on others.4 ' In the tax
context specifically, it matters greatly whether taxes are framed as
indications of government waste or as contributions to public goods. 4'
It is possible to manipulate reactions to a proposed tax by adjusting
the framing of the question to emphasize either the cost of the tax or
the benefits to be provided with the tax.'42
The question of framing takes on special significance in the
context of the estate tax. Perhaps as a result of its philosophical
underpinnings, the tax has almost invariably been framed as a means
of breaking down concentrations of wealth that are deemed to be
excessive and unfair.43  Rather than starting with the goal of
140. See James Andreoni, Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive
and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments, 110 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2 (1995); see also
Eun-Soo Park, Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: A Further Experimental Study of
Framing Effects on Free-Riding, 43 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 405, 406 (2000) (discussing
framing literature and reporting further findings showing that this framing effect is
significant for individuals with an "individualistic value orientation" and "rather
insignificant" for those with a "cooperative value orientation").
141. See John S. Carroll, Compliance With the Law: A Decision-Making Approach to
Taxpaying, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 319, 326-27 (1987) (discussing the use of these
alternative frames).
142. See ALAN LEWIS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TAXATION 48 tbl.4.2 (1982) (presenting
a table entitled "How to Record the Fiscal Preferences You Want From Attitude Surveys
and Public Opinion Polls"). It might be objected that differences in reactions that result
from leaving out important information (the benefits that the revenue can provide)
suggest that the conceptual problem is not truly one of "framing" (where equivalent
information is presented in different ways) but rather just a case of omitting important
information. This is a fair point. However, this use of the term "framing" is consistent
with its use in the existing literature about the psychology of taxation, where framing is
sometimes characterized as a mental "editing" of the problem situation to focus on certain
elements. See PAUL WEBLEY ET AL., TAX EVASION: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 82
(1991) ("By editing or framing the situation, a simplification occurs that directs the
attention to specific constituents of the restructured problem."); see also Carroll, supra
note 141, at 326 (explaining that "[t]he framing process helps the decision maker simplify
the situation by directing attention to some factors, ignoring others, and encoding aspects
into meaningful forms"). Nevertheless, nothing of moment turns on this use of the term,
and another term such as "conceptualization" or "presentation" could be substituted
without changing the basic argument.
143. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277 (1971) (explaining that the
purpose of inheritance and gift taxes and other restrictions on bequests "is not to raise
revenue (release resources to government) but gradually and continually to correct the
distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value
of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity"); SHOUP, supra note 3, at 100-01
(listing the three goals of the estate tax as "taxation of windfalls," "taxation of property
once a generation," and "taxation to reduce concentration"); Ascher, supra note 31, at 74
("Children lucky enough to have been raised, acculturated, and educated by wealthy
parents need not be allowed the additional good fortune of inheriting their parents'
property."); D.W. Haslett, Is Inheritance Justified?, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 122, 123-24
(1986) (focusing on unequal concentrations of wealth); McCaffery, supra note 103, at 1435
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improving opportunities for the less well-off and only then searching
for a likely revenue source for achieving this goal, proponents of the
estate tax start (and often end) with a direct attack on wealth
accumulations. The metaphor of a footrace is often employed in
support of limiting inheritance, using imagery that emphasizes taking
away an unfair "head start." '4 Significantly, this image suggests that
the important work of the tax involves dragging people backwards to
the "fair" starting line. Under this model, any improvement in the
relative position of the less well-off is a function of the tax's
destructive work, not a result of revenue that is spent in a manner
that boosts the less well-off to a more competitive position.
It is worth considering how far this frame diverges from that
usually associated with taxation. The need for important benefits
(and thus for revenue) usually receives top billing, with the tax
representing a necessary means to that end rather than an end in
itself. This is true even when the effect of the tax is redistributive.
For example, the progressive income tax is usually justified not on the
grounds that some people have "too much" income and that it
therefore must be taken away, but rather on the grounds that people
with more income are in a better position to bear a larger proportion
of the costs of providing an important basket of benefits to society. In
contrast, the estate tax is rarely presented as a revenue-raising tax
(although it does raise some revenue),145 much less as a tax that
(discussing the intellectual history of the estate tax and the focus of thinkers like Bentham
and Mill on breaking up wealth concentrations). Interestingly, however, the imposition of
wealth taxes at death originated in the United States in response to specific revenue crises
relating to wars and impending wars; death taxes were introduced and repealed three
separate times between 1797 and 1903 as these crises arose and passed, and the
introduction of the estate tax in 1916 was related to revenue concerns presented by World
War I. David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CANADIAN
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 6-7 (1993). Revenue considerations also spurred the
introduction of similar taxes in Great Britain and Canada. See id.
144. See, e.g., Haslett, supra note 143, at 145 (discussing the advantages of taking away
a competitor's "head start" in a footrace).
145. In 2000, the IRS netted $28.9 billion in estate and gift taxes, which constituted
1.5% of its net collections that year. The estate tax accounted for the bulk of these
collections (nearly $25 billion, or 1.3% of net revenues). IRS, 2000 IRS DATA BOOK,
PUBLICATION 55B, at tbl.1 (Sept. 2001) ("Summary of Internal Revenue Collections, by
Type of Tax, Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000"), at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/display/0,,il%3D
40%26genericld%3D16853,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In
addition, state governments collected $7.5 billion in estate and inheritance taxes in 1999,
about 1.5% of all state tax revenues. Kevin Sack, States Expecting to Lose Billions from
Repeal of U.S. Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2001, at Al. But see B. Douglas
Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, 1 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 113, 135 (1987)
(explaining that one must take into account the impact on income tax revenues associated
with estate tax avoidance behaviors in order to determine how much revenue the income
tax raises and arguing that "common planning techniques severely cripple the ability of
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actually provides concrete valuable benefits to members of society.
The revenue it raises is conceptualized as a somewhat awkward by-
product, not its driving force. As Frank Knight put it, "The public
confiscation of wealth at the death of the owner raises the question of
what would be done with it.' 146 Indeed it does, and even those who
147strongly oppose inherited wealth seem to have few answers.
This way of framing the issue makes the estate tax less attractive
to people than it otherwise might be. Significantly, it makes the tax
appear to have only a down-side and no up-side. When a loss is
framed in isolation, rather than bundled with a corresponding benefit,
it is unsurprising that it will be viewed unfavorably.148 To be sure,
those who emphasize the importance of removing wealth
accumulations from the rich have in mind a corresponding advantage
to the rest of society-greater equality of opportunity. Yet how this
advantage will be manifested is not clear, and people may question
whether gratuitously removing wealth will, on its own, do much to
further this vague objective. 49 It has been well noted that simply
reducing wealth accumulations does little to undo other, larger
sources of inequality of opportunity, such as the fact that some
parents invest more heavily than do others in developing the human
capital of their children."' The possibility that the revenues collected
the federal government to achieve the dual purposes of promoting equity and raising
revenue through estate taxation"); McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 299-304
(contending that the estate tax raises little revenue).
146. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 373 (Augustus M. Kelley
1964) (1921).
147. See, e.g., Haslett, supra note 143, at 137-38 (describing a proposal in which estates
would be confiscated by the government "for the general welfare," with the confiscated
property sold to the highest bidder to prevent undue government ownership of the means
of production).
148. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 139, at 283 ("[T]he experience of a change
for the worse may vary if the change is framed as an uncompensated loss or as a cost
incurred to achieve some benefit.").
149. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES
AND JUSTICE 159 (2002) (arguing that, "given the importance of human capital, worsening
the situation of those with inherited wealth seems unlikely to do much to improve the
prospects of those with the most restricted overall opportunities"); id. at 187 (explaining
that, however undeserved much of inherited wealth may be, "bringing down the top,
unless it is a means of bringing up the rest, is not a policy that can be easily defended by
politically attractive arguments").
150. See, e.g., id. at 158-59 (noting the significance of human capital passed from
parents to children in generating inequalities and explaining that "It]his source of
inequality is probably impossible to eliminate-short of abolishing the family"); Walter J.
Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
417, 502-03 (1952) (noting that economic inequality among children primarily results from
disparate expenditures for their health, education, and welfare, and observing that "[n]o
progressive inheritance tax, or combination of gift and inheritance taxes, can touch this
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from such a tax could help to achieve the objective of equalizing
opportunities (by, for example, subsidizing human capital investments
among the poor) is only occasionally acknowledged.'
The up-side of the estate tax is not easy to detect in public policy
discussions either. There are no special programs financed by the
estate tax, and nothing of value has ever been identified as having
been made possible by it. The revenues collected through the estate
tax are a very small fraction of the total revenues collected by the
Internal Revenue Service, and they are simply dropped, without
further ado, into the government's large revenue bucket.'52
Opponents of the estate tax seize upon this "drop in the bucket"
quality of the estate tax, presenting it as proof that the tax does
nothing of value."'S Proponents of the estate tax occasionally attempt
to present the tax in terms of its power to fund specific, important
programs. For example, one organization opposed to elimination of
the estate tax listed a slate of important programs on its website that
could all be funded with estate tax revenues.'54 Such efforts are
unlikely to be persuasive-people know the estate tax does not
"really" fund these programs, and that funding instead comes from a
general revenue bucket that is filled above the ninety-eight percent
source of economic inequalities among children" (citation omitted)); Kaplow, supra note
4, at 194-95 (noting that most intergenerational transfers are in the form of human capital
and questioning the coherence of an estate and gift tax system that omits these types of
transfers).
151. For a recent article noting this possibility, see Repetti, supra note 65, at 852 ("An
important goal of a tax to prevent wealth concentrations should be to raise revenues to
fund education and build an infrastructure (including communications and transportation)
that will increase opportunities for all citizens."). See also MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note
149, at 158-59 (observing that "adequate public education for all" would help to reduce
the inequality in human capital investments and suggesting that the estate tax might be a
valid way "to raise revenue for legitimate social purposes" if it were found to be more
efficient than alternative taxes); id. at 187 ("Taxation of large family fortunes at death
should certainly be regarded as a legitimate source of revenue for redistribution and other
purposes.").
152. See Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419, 437 (1996)
(noting that "taxes typically flow into a single pot from which the government pays its
bills" making linkages between revenue and ends difficult to find); supra note 145
(quantifying 2000 estate tax revenues as a percentage of net revenues collected that year
by the IRS).
153. See McCaffery & Wagner, supra note 108, at 805 (arguing that the estate tax does
not raise revenue "for valuable social purposes" and citing the fact that "the death tax
raises a small amount of revenue: 20-25 billion in a $2 trillion budget").
154. The group is OMB Watch, and the website is http://www.ombwatch.org/article/
articleview/400/1/93/ (listing such programs as Head Start and the Child Care Block
Grant) (last visited Jan. 4, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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mark with revenue from other sources.155 People recognize that the
loss of revenues from the estate tax would not necessarily determine
the fate or funding levels of any of the listed programs, and they
might optimistically assume that only government "fat" or "waste"
would be cut as a result of the decrease in revenue."'
In sum, when taxpayers search their memories in response to a
survey question about the estate tax, they will find no ready answer to
the question "what have you done for me lately?"; indeed, they
cannot even find answers to the question "what have you done for me
ever?" It is true that people pay other taxes, notably income taxes,
without knowing much about precisely where the money goes or what
it accomplishes."' Nevertheless, most people understand that many
of the ongoing government expenditures that they see around them
are largely supported by income taxes. Thus, income taxes, while
widely resented, are grudgingly tolerated as offsets against income
that make life in civil society possible. It seems people should also
recognize and appreciate the fact that the estate tax helps to supply
this same set of benefits. Indeed, we might expect a rational taxpayer
who stands little chance of being subject to the estate tax to applaud
when he sees estate tax revenues going into the same heap as income
tax revenues; he can expect to share in the incremental benefits
associated with the estate tax without being likely to bear any of the
burden. Why is this not the case?
The phenomenon of mental accounting may be of help here.158
Income taxes are most likely perceived as ongoing operating expenses
(for the individual or for the corporation) that make possible the
ongoing operating expenses of government. The estate tax, which
involves the collection of a one-time lump sum from the accumulated
wealth of a decedent, may be perceived as coming from an entirely
different mental account. It seems incongruous for a discrete and
highly salient lump of taxes to be collected at a highly salient time (a
person's death) and then be put to no similarly salient purpose.
Taking a discrete lump of money that was already taxed when earned,
155. IRS, supra note 145 (indicating that the estate tax comprised approximately 1.3%
of net revenues in 2000).
156. See Rakowski, supra note 152, at 425 (explaining that people may oppose the
estate tax because they do not believe the loss in revenue will harm them).
157. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy,
and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 178-86 (1996) (observing that
the benefits of taxes are physically and temporally separated from the tax payment and
discussing the impact of this fact on taxpayer attitudes).
158. For a general discussion of mental accounting, see THALER, supra note 22, at 107-
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and then using it for ordinary government expenditures (that is, the
very same expenditures for which income is routinely taxed) can
easily be perceived as double taxation.159 Presumably, other taxes
which place burdens on dollars that were already taxed when
earned-such as the property tax, which taxes property for which
after-tax dollars were paid-are not commonly viewed as double
taxation because they are viewed as serving wholly different purposes
than the income tax. To the extent the estate tax is perceived as
serving a purpose different from the income tax, it is one that many
Americans view as illegitimate-the breaking down of wealth, or the
punishing of the wealthy.
All this might explain why people who are actually subject to the
estate tax would dislike it. But it can also explain why people who
have no reason to ever expect to be subject to the estate tax might
also oppose it. If people can readily perceive the down-side of a tax
and can see no clear way in which it benefits them, then opposing the
tax would appear to be unambiguously correct, regardless of how
unlikely it might be that the tax would actually be imposed on one's
own estate. 60 In other words, the typical framing of the estate tax
issue has the effect of erasing the entire right-hand side of the
equation we looked at earlier161 and reducing expected benefits from
the tax in all cases to zero. It is as if the money collected through the
tax is simply poured down a drain. Because everyone runs some
159. Some commentators have discussed the alternative of simply taxing the
inheritance as income to the beneficiaries, see HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 465
(6th ed. 2002), an approach that might seem to solve this cognitive problem. However, if
beneficiaries adjust their baselines to take into account the inherited funds, the payment of
estate taxes might be more squarely framed as a loss than is presently the case.
Compliance could also be a problem. See Scott J. Boylan & Geoffrey B. Sprinkle,
Experimental Evidence on the Relation Between Tax Rates and Compliance: The Effect of
Earned vs. Endowed Income, 23 J. AM. TAX'N ASS'N 75, 87 (2001) (presenting
experimental results suggesting that where income is endowed, taxpayers react to a tax
rate increase by reporting less income; where income was earned, more income was
reported).
160. Eric Rakowski makes the converse point that people may not believe they will
lose anything if the estate tax is abolished:
Even those who do not believe they have more than a slight chance of becoming
tycoons might favor the abolition of an estate tax on self-interested grounds.
They might believe that the abolition of wealth transfer taxes would not hurt
them, because other taxes, in fact, would not be raised to make up the shortfall in
revenue (the government would borrow more or spend less instead), whereas
repealing the estate tax could help them if they get lucky.
Rakowski, supra note 152, at 425.
161. See text accompanying supra notes 114-16 (observing that a rational actor should
support the estate taxation if expected liability multiplied by the probability of imposition
is lower than the benefits the individual expects to receive from the tax revenues).
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chance, however remote, of being subject to the tax, everyone would
be expected to oppose it if it is perceived as generating no benefits at
all. 162
Moreover, the estate tax is often perceived not only as a no-win
proposition, but also as a strategic game against a greedy and
unscrupulous opponent, the government.163 In other words, not only
is the money collected through the tax perceived as being poured
down a drain, but it is also viewed as being poured down a drain
rather gleefully by a government that delights in depriving citizens of
the fruits of their labors.1' The rhetoric surrounding the estate tax,
which often focuses on the purported need to break down
accumulations of wealth, reinforces this notion. It is also possible that
the estate tax is viewed with even more aversion because of its
perceived "voluntary" character."' The existence of well-known
opportunities to avoid paying the estate tax may present a dynamic
much like that experienced by many people in preparing to haggle
with an automobile dealer-one fears that one will not manage to
162. Likewise, framing might explain why the overoptimistic discounting discussed
above, supra note 138, would not necessarily lead people to support the estate tax.
Overoptimistic discounting might indeed have the effect of making the costs of the tax
appear disproportionately small relative to its benefits. But if the way in which the tax is
framed makes it appear to generate zero benefits, even the most overly optimistic
discounting could not turn an individual into an estate tax proponent.
163. Edward McCaffery considers the possibility that people may experience "a
phenomenon of 'tax aversion,' akin to but distinct from loss aversion, whereby individuals
attach disproportionate disutility to government extractions perceived or labelled as
taxes." McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1878; see also John S. Carroll, Taxation: Compliance
with Federal Personal Income Tax Laws, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 507,
519-20 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (discussing the possibility that people
may frame taxation in negative terms such as "losing a game against the government");
Rakowski, supra note 152, at 424 (suggesting that some opposition to the estate tax likely
"stems from the desire that the government not claim a large slice of their winnings should
they strike it rich" (citation omitted)). The possibility that many taxpayers view the
government as an opponent to be outdone is consistent with observed phenomena in other
tax contexts. For example, people may set up unprofitable tax shelters and consume tax
deductible items beyond the point where they provide any net benefits to the taxpayer.
See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1914-15 & n.135, 1918. These activities fail to profit the
taxpayer, but they deprive the government of revenues and may therefore allow the
taxpayer to enjoy the perception that he is "beating the IRS."
164. See McCaffery, supra note 103, at 1443 (finding it unacceptable that after "good
and noble Americans" spend their lives working and saving, "their distant Uncle Sam
should be dancing on their graves").
165. See COOPER, supra note 11, at 1-2; see also Gale, supra note 19, at 351-52
(observing that estate taxes can be characterized as 'voluntary' in the sense that at least
some portion of the tax is avoidable, but that they are not really 'voluntary' in the usual
meaning of the word, given the costs associated with tax avoidance).
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play the game as well as others, or as well as one should have.66 An
additional element of distaste associated with the possibility that one
will be "suckered" may, therefore, make the tax even less palatable. 67
Together with the human tendency towards optimism, framing
goes much of the way towards explaining the otherwise inexplicable
opposition to the estate tax. But there is yet another source of
opposition to the estate tax that warrants mention.
3. Savings and Security
Intrafamilial transfers can serve important purposes. For
example, transfers of wealth within the family are sometimes used to
compensate individual family members for bad luck or a lack of other
sorts of endowments, and thus may involve a measure of
redistribution in the direction of equality. In a broader sense,
accumulated familial wealth may be conceptualized as a form of
social insurance for the family, to be drawn upon as needs arise.'69
The family's desire to maintain that same store of security even after
the death of the family member who accumulated it (an event that
has presumably already deprived the family unit of other tangible and
intangible sources of support) is intuitively understandable. The
estate tax might, therefore, seem to undercut a deeply ingrained
166. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 157, at 197-99 (discussing the impact on taxpayer
attitudes and behaviors of rumors that others are getting away with tax avoidance or
evasion).
167. See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of
Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 403 (1994)
("Human beings possess a very strong emotional desire not to be suckered."); cf id. at 401
(discussing literature on tax evasion that suggests that "people are more willing to pay
their 'fair share' of taxes if they believe that others are not cheating the government").
168. See Nigel Tomes, The Family, Inheritance, and the Intergenerational Transmission
of Equality, 89 J. POL. ECON. 928, 955 (1981) (describing empirical findings based on a
sample of estates in Cleveland in 1964-65 that "strongly confirm the equalizing role of
inheritance" and that indicate wealth transfers are " 'compensatory'-in that (other things
being equal) children with low incomes receive greater bequests than their better endowed
contemporaries"). The net effect of this distribution of inherited wealth is not only
greater equality within the family, but also greater equality "among families in the same
income/education stratum." Id. at 956.
169. See, e.g., Karl Kronebusch & Mark Schlesinger, Intergenerational Transfers, in
INTERGENERATIONAL LINKAGES: HIDDEN CONNECTIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 112,
116 (Vern L. Bengtson & Robert A. Harootyan eds., 1994) (noting that "[p]rivate
transfers may also provide a 'safety net' for individuals whose needs are not met by their
own efforts or public assistance" and may even compensate for imbalances in public
benefits distributed to the various age groups (citation omitted)).
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impulse-that of accumulating and transferring wealth for the
security of one's familyY°
Moreover, these accumulations of wealth often represent the
hard work, sacrifice, and self-deprivation of the individual saver.17 1
The purpose of such accumulations is not self-evident; indeed, they
often appear to do little to maximize the utility of individual savers or
that of their eventual beneficiaries. These painfully accumulated
savings make more sense if one understands their goal to be that of
providing family members with security and resources that will allow
them to thrive as a group. While this desire for the group's long-term
success could be characterized as a mere "preference" that could be
accommodated within a rational actor framework, the impulse seems
to transcend the atomistic preferences of individual rational actors.
Regardless of how we label this impulse towards family security, it
points to another source of opposition to the estate tax-one that fits
with the pejorative "death tax" rhetoric. Why should a family's
security (in the form of accumulated wealth) be depleted at precisely
the moment that the family's security (in the form of human capital)
has been deeply shaken by the loss of a family member? '73
There are some partial responses to this "savings and security"
objection. First, it will not typically be the case that a death
generating a taxable estate will simultaneously deprive the family of
significant amounts of security in the form of human capital.
Presumably, most decedents who leave behind taxable estates are
retired at the time of death. '74 Second, one might argue that
extremely large accumulations of wealth are not really necessary to
provide basic familial security. One might argue that the urge to
accumulate wealth is a little like the tendency to eat high-calorie
foods; what was perhaps at one time an effective survival technique is
170. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1944 (suggesting that wealth transfer taxes "run
counter to a deep-seated human instinct.., to provide for one's heirs").
171. See generally THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE
NEXT DOOR: THE SURPRISING SECRETS OF AMERICA'S WEALTHY (1996) (describing
the frugality that some millionaires practice and positing that this frugality was
instrumental in their wealth accumulations).
172. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 22, at 656 (asking who, if anyone, receives utility from
bequests).
173. Such considerations, coupled with the incongruity of the government profiting
from certain categories of untimely deaths, may help to explain Congress's decision to
provide significant estate tax relief to victims of terrorist attacks. See Victims of Terrorism
Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 103(a), 115 Stat. 2427, 2430-31 (codified at
I.R.C. § 2201 (Lexis Supp. 2002)).
174. Sixty-two percent of the taxable estate tax returns filed in 1992 were for decedents
over age eighty. Poterba, supra note 3, at 242 (citing M.B. Eller, Federal Taxation of
Wealth Transfers, 1992-1995, STAT. INCOME BULL. 16 (1996)).
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now all too often overdone, leading to many problems.' In modern
times, the amount of wealth that can be accumulated and stored far
exceeds that which would be necessary to offer a reasonable measure
of security to one's family. Society has also developed means for
dealing with contingencies, such as life insurance, that might seem
preferable to the accumulation of massive amounts of wealth.
Nevertheless, some deaths may generate insecurity for those left
behind, and adding an estate tax may seem to make matters worse.
For example, some decedents may leave behind security for the
family in the form of a family business or a family farm (or some
other large illiquid asset), and this source of security might be lost if
the illiquid items must be sold to pay estate taxes.'76 While the specter
of a family losing its business or farm as a result of the estate tax is
based more on myth than on reality,' and while special estate tax
provisions applicable to these assets reduce the chances of such a
scenario,... cases may at least sometimes arise in which illiquid
inherited assets must be sold in order to pay estate taxes.'79
175. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage:
Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141, 1175 (2001)
(observing that cravings for sweet foods, which may have been adaptive in the past, now
often lead to obesity and health problems).
176. On the symbolic role of the family business and its widespread appeal, see Blatt,
supra note 129, at 331. See also Haslett, supra note 143, at 149-51 (discussing and
addressing difficulties posed by family businesses and farms for his proposal to abolish
inheritance).
177. See, e.g., Burman, supra note 108, at 675-76 (noting that only 2,000 of the 32,000
estates subject to taxation in 1995 were those of small business owners or farmers, that
these represented only about .01% of all small businesses in existence the previous year,
and that "most of the small businesses subject to estate taxes hold more than enough
liquid assets at death to pay the tax, for example from the proceeds of life insurance
policies" (citation omitted)); Johnston, supra note 40 (claiming that, despite the rhetoric,
few working farmers are subject to the estate tax, and noting that experts, including the
American Farm Bureau Federation, which lobbies to abolish the estate tax, cannot cite
even a single example of a farm being lost due to the estate tax).
178. See Leonard E. Burman & William G. Gale, The Estate Tax Is Down, But Not
Out, 94 TAX NOTES 1039, 1043 (2002) (discussing provisions applicable to small
businesses); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk About the 'Death' Tax: Politics,
Economics, and Morality, 89 TAX NOTES 1159, 1162 (2000) (discussing the many special
provisions of the estate tax that provide tax-preferred treatment to owners of family farms
and other family-owned small businesses). Some of these provisions were impacted by the
recent tax reforms. For example, I.R.C. § 2057 (Lexis 2001), which allows a deduction for
a decedent's interest in family-owned businesses, is repealed for estates of decedents dying
after December 31, 2003. See id. § 2057 (amended by EGTRRA § 521(d)). Another
important provision, id. § 6166, permits estate taxes relating to an interest in a closely-held
business to be deferred and then paid in installments. EGTRRA extended this
installment-payment option to certain additional business interests and expanded the
number of partners or shareholders that may hold interests in a business eligible for the
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The possibility that an estate tax will undercut family security,
constrain family choices, or dramatically alter the lifestyles of family
members is a serious concern, and one that is heightened by the fact
that death, the tax's trigger, may have already destabilized the family
emotionally, if not financially. Such concerns form the basis for a
broad philosophical objection to the estate tax. To the extent the
objection taps into values widely shared across society, it generates
opposition not only among those who truly expect to be subject to the
estate tax, but also among those who think their chances of being
subjected to the tax are small or indeed nonexistent." Here again, it
is significant that the estate tax is framed as generating no specific
benefits for anyone. Objecting to the estate tax on these
philosophical grounds thus involves no perceived tradeoffs in the
form of forgone benefits. Moreover, the "savings and security"
argument provides (for many) a satisfying and complete response to
the argument that accumulations of wealth "should" be broken down.
III. OBSERVATIONS AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Parts I and II have provided a positive account of the behavior of
wealthy taxpayers and ordinary citizens with regard to the estate tax.
Cognitive theory adds explanatory force to that account. In this part,
I will consider how this fuller positive account might alter our
understanding of the estate tax, and how this enhanced understanding
might inform a normative analysis of the tax.
Three assumptions underlie what follows. First, I assume that
society has decided, for its own compelling normative reasons, that
redistribution is a valid objective of tax policy. 8' Put another way,
installment plan from fifteen to forty-five. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 571, 572, 115
Stat. 38, 92-93 (June 7, 2001) (codified at scattered sections of I.R.C.).
179. Burman, supra note 108, at 675 ("[It is] clear that estate taxes do cause some
families to sell inherited assets to pay their tax bill."). Other theoretical problems
involving illiquid assets might also be imagined, such as the possibility that a family
inheriting a celebrity's valuable publicity rights might be forced to capitalize on those
rights simply to pay the estate taxes. See Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate
Taxes and the Compelled Commodification of Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759, 777-82
(1998) (discussing this possibility).
180. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 4, at 193-94 (discussing the possibility that "transfer
taxation may be viewed as a penalty on success-or worse, on success combined with
generosity toward one's children-in which case transfer taxation may be seen as
undesirable because it is corrosive of social norms favoring hard work and caring for one's
family" and suggesting that this is one factor that "may help to explain why estate and gift
taxation is unpopular among individuals who are unlikely ever to have to pay the tax").
181. See Rakowski, supra note 152, at 438 (setting forth the various goals of taxation,
which, in addition to redistribution, include provision of public goods and provision of
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society has reached the conclusion that the achievement of certain
social goals requires moving resources to certain groups of people,
and has further concluded that the resources in question are best
raised through taxation. Because a great deal of the revenue raised
by taxes other than the estate tax is used for redistributive purposes,"'
it is fair to say that we inhabit a society in which redistributive
taxation is an established fact, and that we will continue to inhabit
such a society whether or not the estate tax is eliminated. This is not
to say that there is universal agreement about the appropriate level of
redistribution, about who should benefit from such redistribution, or
even about whether government should be involved in redistribution
at all. I am making the more limited assumption that the
redistributive use of tax revenues is, in fact, a robust and persistent
feature of our society, and one that will continue regardless of the
fate of the estate tax.
Next, I assume that one of the goals that we, as a society, wish to
achieve through redistributive tax policy is increased equality of
opportunity for those who are less well-off. I am speaking here of the
sorts of measures that would prevent certain morally arbitrary factors,
such as childhood poverty, from blocking the full development and
use of human capital.'83 Increasing equality of opportunity along this
dimension fits well with both fairness-based and efficiency-based
normative theories. The fairness argument is self-evident-allowing
well-off children to develop their full potential while leaving
untapped and undeveloped the human capital of poor children
offends basic notions of fair play."8  While facilitating the
appropriate incentives to engage in or refrain from engaging in certain favored or
disfavored behaviors).
. 182. For example, the vast and redistributive Social Security system is funded entirely
through payroll taxes. See ROSEN, supra note 159, at 184-87 (discussing the funding and
distributive impacts of Social Security). Numerous other redistributive programs are
funded out of general tax revenues, less than 1.5% of which are generated by the estate
tax. See supra note 145.
183. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 16 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining that "it is
fully in keeping with the capital concept as traditionally defined to say that expenditures
on education, training, medical care, etc., are investments in capital").
184. The fairness argument is clearest and least controversial in the case of children,
because adults may have made past choices that contributed to their current wealth level
and their currently constrained opportunities. Inequality that results from what Ronald
Dworkin terms "option luck"-the luck that results from voluntary choices people make
about how to live their lives-is likely to be less troubling than that which stems from
"brute bad luck"-the sort of bad luck that is utterly out of individual control. See Ronald
Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283,
293-95 (1981) (distinguishing between these two types of luck and suggesting that differing
amounts of income and wealth resulting from differences in option luck are not
inconsistent with the notion of equality of resources).
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development of individual talents and abilities (which are themselves
unequally distributed by nature) is insufficient to satisfy some
conceptions of fair equality of opportunity,'85 fairness surely demands
at least that much.
There are also efficiency benefits associated with enabling people
to fully develop their abilities and to put those abilities to their
highest and best use. 6 When individuals are not permitted to
develop or use their talents, potential human capital is squandered,
and society suffers.'87 It is worth pointing out that children, in
particular, cannot be expected to invest optimally in their own human
capital." Children lack the ability to borrow against their future
productive potential to finance such investments, even if they
possessed the foresight and inclination to do so. 189 Moreover, due to
capital lending market imperfections, impoverished parents also lack
the wherewithal to make optimal investments in their children's
human capital, no matter how much they might wish to make these
investments. 9° This rationale supports the free provision of public
185. See RAWLS, supra note 143, at 74 (asserting that "[t]here is no more reason to
permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural
assets than by historical and social fortune"); David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction
Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171,
175 (1992) (arguing that "[i]f equality of opportunity means that a person's fortunes
should not be determined by factors over which he or she has no control, then allowing
people's talents to affect their fortunes violates equality of opportunity").
186. Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Market for Children's
Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1947 (1993) (explaining that society benefits from
investments in human capital "as more productive individuals contribute more. to social
wealth and are less likely to depend on transfer payments from others for subsistence").
187. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
80-81 (1975) (describing the "inadequate development of the human resources of the
children of poor families" as "one of the most serious inefficiencies of the American
economy today"); BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND
DISCRIMINATION 172 (8th ed. 2001) (explaining that disparities in opportunities based on
factors such as race or wealth prevent society from achieving its productive potential); Lee
Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare
Conundrum, 1994 WISC. L. REV. 235, 267-69 (observing that inequality of opportunity
leads to less efficient development and deployment of human capital).
188. See Stout, supra note 186, at 1949-51 (discussing factors that keep children from
investing optimally in their own human capital).
189. See id. at 1949 n.19 (discussing lack of wealth as an impediment to investments by
children in their own human capital).
190. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 183, at 93 (explaining that "it is difficult to borrow
funds to invest in human capital because such capital cannot be offered as collateral");
OKUN, supra note 187, at 80 (explaining that discrimination in access to capital results in
"inefficiency and inequality of opportunity [that] curb investment by the poor in setting up
businesses, in buying homes, in education, and in all forms of human capital"); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 166 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the "danger of
underinvestment in children"); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
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education, but the idea logically extends further to other goods that
are instrumental to the achievement of children's full potential (e.g.,
adequate nutrition and basic medical care). Because the kind of
equality of opportunity that leads to the optimal development of
human potential can further fairness and efficiency simultaneously, it
is something many people can agree on, at least in principle.
Third, and perhaps least controversially, I assume that, to the
extent we are going to use tax policy to pursue increased equality of
opportunity of the sort just described, we would want to do so in the
manner that generates the largest gains at the lowest cost. Even if
there is wide disagreement about where to strike the balance between
costs and gains, choosing a mechanism that generates a larger unit of
gain for each unit of cost seems unambiguously preferable. I am
concerned, then, with exploring whether some appropriately-
reformed version of the estate tax might possess some unique and
unrecognized advantages in this regard. The two puzzles discussed
above bear upon this question in interesting ways and provide
guidance in pinpointing the sorts of reforms that might enable the
estate tax to work better.
A. Rethinking the Estate Tax
An estate tax might operate in either of two radically different
ways, and it is often unclear in debates over the tax which of these
two possibilities is contemplated. The result is a predictably muddled
discourse. The analysis developed in Parts I and II can help sort out
these conflicting visions of the estate tax.
First, an estate tax might work to consciously make certain
choices more costly in an effort to influence those choices, as does a
"sin tax." Thus, a tax on cigarettes or alcohol might be designed to
change behavior by shifting consumption from the taxed item to
other, more innocuous items that have fewer harmful societal effects.
The existence of the tax causes some people to refrain from
consuming products they would otherwise consume in the absence of
the tax, presumably substituting less-preferred alternatives (chewing
gum, perhaps, or root beer) and incurring utility losses (at least in the
short term) as a result. These utility losses are not made up for by
any revenue gains to the government, so we might initially classify
309, 316-17 (1986) (discussing imperfect capital markets and the implications for access to
higher education); Stout, supra note 186, at 1948 n.15 (collecting sources discussing these
market imperfections).
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them as deadweight losses."' However, if we assume that the
disfavored categories of consumption impose costs on society as a
whole, then society does receive a corresponding benefit from the
change in behavior-it does not come in the form of collected
revenue, but rather in the form of reduced societal expenses for
things such as health care.
If such a tax is set right, it makes people internalize the costs
associated with particular consumption decisions, and therefore
encourages them to do the right thing. In theory, we get the "right"
number of smokers by changing the price of smoking to reflect its full
cost (that is, only people who really value it more than it costs
themselves and society will continue smoking). The central fact
about this sort of tax is that its administrators are indifferent about
the amount of revenue it raises; it is not designed to raise revenue,
but rather to rectify a pricing flaw existing in the private market. Any
revenue collected can be used to offset the societal costs associated
with the choices people are making, but it is perfectly fine if no
revenue is collected (that just means that once people confront the
true cost of a particular consumption choice, they do not choose it).
It is possible to conceive of the estate tax in this same way. The
rhetoric surrounding the estate tax often suggests that accumulations
of wealth are bad per se, and that the estate tax is philosophically
justified as a means of breaking down those accumulations. If this is
in fact how we perceive the purposes of the estate tax, then the tax is
working best when it raises the least revenue-at least if we think the
reason it is failing to raise revenue is because people are changing
their behavior so that large quantities of wealth are no longer
amassed and transferred intergenerationally. '92 To the extent the tax
induces behavioral changes in the direction of less accumulation and
more spending and dispersal, individuals would incur utility losses,
but if these were smaller than the societal costs that were avoided as a
result, the behavioral shifts would be desirable. This way of
understanding the estate tax provides a convenient set of responses to
many of the stock arguments against the tax. Against the objection
that the tax is not raising much revenue, one can respond, "well, it
isn't supposed to."' 93 Against the objection that the tax lowers rates
191. A tax generates a "deadweight loss" or "excess burden" to the extent it imposes
costs that exceed the revenues collected by the government. See ROSEN, supra note 159,
at 282 (defining "excess burden" as "a loss of welfare above and beyond the tax revenues
collected").
192. See Duff, supra note 143, at 8.
193. See id. (discussing responses to the complaint that the estate tax does not raise
very much revenue).
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of capital accumulation and causes people to spend rather than save,
one can likewise respond "that's the whole point, isn't it?"
As attractive as these responses are to estate tax proponents
faced with a tax that does not generate much revenue and which
allegedly discourages savings, the "sin tax" justification for the estate
tax stands on shaky ground. This entire justification collapses if the
idea that wealth accumulations are harmful for society is rejected as a
normative matter, or if the opposite normative view holds sway-that
accumulating wealth is generally good for society (that is, that these
accumulations generate positive rather than negative externalities).
Accordingly, some indictments of the estate tax focus heavily on the
normative desirability of private wealth accumulations and the moral
blamelessness (indeed, virtue!) of savings behaviors, and express
dismay at the fact that such laudable activities and outcomes could be
the target of taxation.94
Conceptualizing the estate tax in this first way risks positioning
the tax as one that sets out to consciously destroy the wealth and
opportunities of those engaging in socially desirable activities. Under
this view, the estate tax is necessarily framed as one whose only
benefit is a negative one-keeping the rich from getting too rich by
taking away some of their riches (or persuading them not to
accumulate so much in the first place). If popular normative
judgments fail to endorse such "leveling down" as beneficial, then the
tax is one that not only has no "up-side" for individuals, but also is a
tax that is fundamentally wrong-headed and counterproductive. The
popular opposition to the estate tax may well be linked to this first
understanding of the tax.
A second way of understanding the estate tax assumes that the
tax is designed to raise revenue, and that its goal is to do so while
imposing the smallest amount of cost possible. If characterized in this
way, the estate tax is not seen as a unique instrument for "breaking
down" wealth by triggering behavior changes, but rather as a garden-
variety revenue-raising tax that attempts to do its job while changing
behavior as little as possible. This way of understanding the tax is not
inconsistent with a world view that holds private fortunes and private
accumulations of wealth and even substantial inheritance of wealth to
be socially valuable and worth preserving. Just as the taxation of
property is not commonly understood to be incompatible with valuing
and preserving the institution of private property, the taxation of
estates need not imply any desire to destroy the target of taxation.
194. See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 343-44.
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Of course, this alternative conceptualization of the tax is not very
convincing if we assume that savings behaviors will respond in an
extremely elastic manner to the estate tax-at the limit, we might
imagine a world in which the taxation of savings leads to elimination
of all savings.9 If people prove willing and able to readily shift their
behavior to avoid a tax, then that tax is not a very good way of raising
revenue (although it may work perfectly well as an intentional
behavior-modification mechanism). But what the low level of inter
vivos giving seems to suggest is that people are perhaps not so ready
and willing to switch their behavior from wealth-holding to wealth-
dispersal. Rather, their preference for wealth-retention is fairly
strong.
Moreover, there are comprehensible reasons why people fail to
readily switch to gift-giving, and at least some of these reasons may be
the product of deeply ingrained features of human cognition. The
same behavioral factors that are dampening the use of inter vivos
giving opportunities might also be expected to dampen other sorts of
wealth-dispersal activities. In other words, looking at inter vivos
giving behavior through the lens of behavioral law and economics
suggests that wealth retention is a strongly preferred behavior, and
that this behavior is both explicable and durable enough upon which
to base tax policy.
To the extent cognitive factors are responsible for these
preferences, however, a separate normative question emerges:
Whether it is appropriate to exploit observed behavioral anomalies
through tax policy)96 This question becomes more tractable when
disaggregated from an antecedent normative question about the
appropriate degree of progressivity in a given tax system and the
relative burdens that should properly be placed on each category of
195. A recent effort to assess the elasticity of behavior in response to estate taxes by
examining the differences in capital accumulations in states with varying state-level estate
taxes is DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN & DONALD MARPLES, DISTORTION COSTS OF TAXING
WEALTH ACCUMULATION: INCOME VERSUS ESTATE TAXES (Nat'l Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 8261, 2001). This study found "a negative relationship
between wealth accumulation and the estate tax, although the statistical precision of the
estimates varies somewhat," and suggested that replacing the estate tax with a tax on
capital income would yield modest efficiency gains. Id. at 21, 28. Holtz-Eakin and
Marples note that their data did not include the most highly affluent portion of the
population who are affected to the greatest degree by the estate tax; the "super rich"
might respond either more or less elastically to the estate tax. Id. at 28 & n.32.
196. See Jolls, supra note 4, at 1677 (discussing the potential to reduce behavioral
distortions by choosing a taxation method that relies on a cognitive bias, and querying
whether it is "proper for government to make use of this error in citizens' perception");
McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1942-43 (discussing similar normative questions).
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taxpayers. Once this determination as to progressivity has been
made, the remaining question is whether a tax system is unacceptable
if it reduces the subjective pain experienced by taxpayers in bearing
what is (by definition) an appropriate share of the tax burden. A
longstanding aphorism about taxation-that it should aim to "shear
the sheep with a minimum of squealing"' 97-suggests that official
efforts to make taxpaying less painful are nothing new. Surely there
is no obligation for government to present its every revenue-raising
action in the least appealing light to maximize the torment it will
cause to citizens.
Of course, if such efforts at pain reduction impeded the
democratic process and compromised the ability of society to arrive at
the "right answer" to the progressivity question, this would be
problematic.9 So, too, would be a system that violated certain
precepts that we might take to be essential to a democratic
government-by, for example, actually defrauding or deceiving
taxpayers. Yet, some degree of manipulation of cognitive biases
already occurs in the tax system (for example, in income tax
withholding from wages). If we think that the group targeted by the
estate tax (the very wealthy) is one that generally tends to exert
disproportionate power in the political arena,'99 the fact that cognitive
biases might to some extent contribute to the economic viability of
the estate tax might seem less troubling. Indeed, one might argue
that the very wealthy have successfully taken advantage of cognitive
biases in their artful framing of the estate tax as a "no win"
proposition, and that a reframing of the tax amounts to a correction
of a pre-existing distortion, rather than the introduction of a new
distortion.
197. Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Earmarking in Britain: Theory and Practice, in THE
CASE FOR EARMARKED TAXES: GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND PUBLIC CHOICE 41, 51
& n.2 (Ranjit S. Teja & Barry Bracewell-Milnes eds., 1991) (tracing one version of this
saying-"plucking the goose [so] as to obtain the largest possible amount of feathers with
the smallest possible amount of hissing"-back to Colbert, the Controller-General of
Finances under Louis XIV).
198. See ROBERT E. LANE, THE LOSS OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 230
(2000) (observing that pain serves an important function in democratic systems and that
the expression of pain serves "to make that system more responsive to popular needs and
demands, that is, to fulfill its central purpose").
199. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1991) (discussing the theory
"that small bodies, groups of powerful or wealthy people, organized around some common
interest, will exercise disproportionate influence on the political process" and observing
that such a belief has long been part of American political discourse (citation omitted)).
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It should be apparent by now that the estate tax need not be
framed as it is currently.20 Reconceptualizing the estate tax as a
viable revenue-raiser enables the estate tax to. be framed in a way that
links it to positive benefits, thus overcoming what is likely one of the
primary sources of popular opposition. The fact that the tax does
raise some revenue might seem already to position the tax as a
revenue-raiser. Yet overcoming the wealth-destroying rhetoric and
the "drop-in-the-bucket" perception of the revenues requires more.
Where redistribution and the enhancement of equality of opportunity
is the goal, the most suitable frame is one that links the two sides of
the redistributive equation-the taxation side and the distribution
side-in a way that resonates with the public's sense of justice.
In fact, the estate tax carries substantial symbolic and rhetorical
freight that ideally positions it to be framed as a mechanism for
enhancing equality of opportunity. In providing increased
opportunities for the least well-off, we might wish to avoid making
any transfers of wealth that would prevent individuals from benefiting
from the opportunities they have created for themselves through
work and savings. Because estate tax revenues come from
beneficiaries who typically did not do anything to earn the taxed
wealth"1 and who have typically also received the benefit of expansive
opportunities earlier in life, the estate tax seems to offer a means for
funding expanded opportunities without diminishing hard-earned
opportunities of others. But in order for the estate tax to be
perceived as enhancing equality of opportunity, it is necessary to
establish that someone is actually being provided with enhanced
opportunities as a result of the tax. This requires linking the
collection of estate tax revenue to specific types of expenditures that
will serve to expand equality of opportunity.2
200. According to Carroll:
Individual taxpayers are motivated in multiple ways, and the way they frame
taxpaying can be manipulated by the media, tax consultants, and the government.
Significant numbers of people can be influenced to perceive taxpaying in positive
terms, as fair, professionally administered, legitimate, collectively good, rather
than in negative terms, as avoiding threat, being taken for a sucker, losing a game
against the government, and so forth.
Carroll, supra note 163, at 519-20.
201. Exceptions are possible, as where the bequests really represent "payment" for
past care. But participants in such veiled employer-employee relationships should not be
able to avoid the income and payroll taxes that typically accompany earned income while
also avoiding the inference that bequests are "unearned."
202. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOIT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 94-112
(1999) (suggesting use of a wealth tax to provide a "stake" of $80,000 to each young
person and noting the appropriateness of using such a tax for that purpose). For the
relevance of expenditures linked to tax, see Carroll, supra note 163, at 512-13 (noting that
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Linking taxing and spending in this manner seems like an
obvious move. The fact that the possibility has not been given greater
attention likely relates to a fundamental disconnect in the way legal
and policy scholars approach their work. A division of intellectual
labor seems to have developed, with tax scholars focusing on optimal
revenue raising (regardless of the purpose) and social welfare policy
scholars focusing on optimal spending (regardless of the source). 3
Coordinating both sides of the redistributive equation permits
redistribution to be more usefully framed for both donors and
donees. In the context of the estate tax, this analysis would suggest
"earmarking" the revenues for use in programs designed to enhance
equality of opportunity.
2 4
The estate tax is custom-made to take advantage of a frame that
links it with opportunity-enhancing programs and can do so far more
powerfully than can another sort of tax. It already carries with it the
rhetoric of equalizing opportunities and by definition involves wealth
that will in any event go to someone who did not earn it (at least not
out in the marketplace). In addition, the fact that the estate tax is
imposed on wealth while it is in transit from a deceased individual to
a beneficiary provides the opportunity to position the tax as a gain-
reducer rather than a loss-creator.205  Much of the negative rhetoric
surrounding the estate tax casts the tax as one that collects money
from dead people.206 Not only does this position the tax as a loss-
generator, but also as one that unfairly inflicts losses on a shockingly
"[t]axpayers who disapprove of government spending, whether on the military or on social
welfare, are more likely to think of taxes as unfair").
203. A taxation casebook sets out the basic task of tax policy as follows: "The
government is spending money. We need to come up with a way to pay for it." JOEL S.
NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 13 (2d
ed. 2002). Of course, the potential to achieve distributive goals through the tax code has
certainly been recognized, and redistributive programs such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit bring some welfare scholars into contact with the tax code. However, the revenue-
raising and social spending sides of the redistributive equation tend to be analyzed
separately.
204. James M. Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. POL. ECON. 457,
457-58 (1963) (" 'Earmarking' is defined as the practice of designating or dedicating
specific revenues to the financing of specific public services."); see infra text accompanying
notes 260-67 (discussing earmarking); cf. William H. Gates, Sr. & Chuck Collins, Tax the
Wealthy: Why America Needs the Estate Tax, AM. PROSPECT, June 17, 2002, at 20, 21
(suggesting that "Congress should explore the possibility of linking estate tax revenue to
the Social Security trust fund").
205. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing a possible way to position the tax as a gain-
reducer); see also supra text accompanying notes 78-81 (discussing the fact that people
show a greater aversion to losses than to failures to secure equivalent gains).
206. Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 1 (citing contributions of Winston Churchill
and Steve Forbes to this rhetoric).
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vulnerable and defenseless group-the dead! Recasting the tax as
one that reduces the amount of unearned wealth beneficiaries will
inherit would not only reposition it as a gain-reducer, but one that
burdens a far less sympathetic group.
If, as suggested above, we conceptualize the estate tax as a
typical revenue-generating tax (and not as a tax designed to change
behavior), a primary economic inquiry then becomes whether this tax
is better than other possible taxes at raising revenue without imposing
costs on society. Because behavioral shifts in reaction to the tax are
presumptively undesirable and costly in this account (rather than
desirable and socially valuable, as in the earlier account) the size and
content of these distortions becomes important in undertaking this
comparative analysis. Two questions follow: How much do people
actually change their behavior in response to the estate tax compared
to other taxes? And how costly are these behavioral changes
compared to those observed in response to other taxes? If persistent
behavioral features are dampening what would otherwise be a
rational response to the tax, then the estate tax may be a less costly
way of redistributing money than economic models would predict. At
a minimum, the muted behavioral response should lead us to look
more carefully at the economic arguments against the estate tax.
B. Saving and Spending
The behavioral distortion that receives top billing in estate tax
discussions is the distortion of the choice between saving and
spending. At least three distinct concerns fall under this rubric. The
first concern relates to the fear that the estate tax will trigger negative
macroeconomic effects by altering society-wide savings levels. The
second concern involves the utility loss that individual taxpayers
suffer when they switch from a more-preferred activity (such as
saving) to another, less-preferred activity (such as spending) as a
result of a tax on the more-preferred activity. The third concern is
that the estate tax will erode savings norms in society by punishing
thrifty 7 I will take up these concerns in turn.
Before doing so, however, a preliminary point must be addressed
to establish the relevance of this inquiry. Even if the size of the
distortion to savings and spending decisions generated by the estate
tax is relatively small, some would argue that it still represents an
207. My categorization scheme builds on one drawn by Holtz-Eakin, supra note 23, at
513 ("[It is important to separate two issues: the interference of the estate tax with
private decisionmaking and the aggregate level of capital accumulation.").
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additional distortion that is uniquely associated with the estate tax,
over and above the distortions that one would expect to see with, say,
an income tax. °8 It might seem, then, that the estate tax is a clear
loser, regardless of the precise size and shape of the distortions to
savings and spending that it occasions. But we cannot simply count
the number of distortions without regard to their respective sizes-
several small distortions might amount to a lower total deadweight
loss than one very large distortion.2' And there is reason to think
that one of the primary distortions usually assumed to accompany the
income tax-the distortion of choices between labor and leisure-is
smaller in the case of the estate tax. An estate tax might be expected
to result in less distortion of the labor/leisure choice than would an
income tax, if only because its imposition is more remote from the
decision point about labor and leisure.210 As a matter of intuition, it
seems unlikely that decisions to earn are greatly influenced by the
existence of an estate tax. 1
In addition, it is important to focus not only on the labor/leisure
decisions made by potential donors, but also those of potential
recipients. Either the donor or the donee, or both, may react to the
tax by working harder, not by working less hard."2 To the extent an
estate tax led beneficiaries to expect smaller bequests, this could lead
them to work harder. On the other hand, if donors reacted to the
estate tax with increased inter vivos giving, the recipients of these
gifts might work less hard. If donors made up for the tax by working
208. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 4, at 170 (explaining that "differential taxes on different
types of consumption expenditures cause distortions among types of consumption but do
not alleviate the labor/leisure distortion").
209. See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin, supra note 23, at 500 n.8 (explaining that "[i]t is tempting,
but mistaken, to 'count' distortions" as a way of determining which of two taxes is
superior; "[blecause the magnitudes of the distortions differ and because distortions
interact, one must compute and compare the overall level of inefficiency in each case");
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare
Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1023 (Alan J. Auerbach &
Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) ("[C]ounting the number of distortions is no way to do
welfare analysis.").
210. See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 124, at 624 ("[T]axes imposed at death may have
smaller disincentive effects on lifetime labor supply and saving than taxes that raise the
same revenue (in present value terms) but are imposed during life."); Holtz-Eakin, supra
note 23, at 512 (discussing how discounting would reduce the distortion in labor supply
associated with an estate tax, as compared with an income tax).
211. See Repetti, supra note 65, at 863 ("[A]sk yourself if your decision to work or
make an investment today was influenced by the thought of your mortality. Probably
not." (citations omitted)).
212. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 149, at 152 (discussing these possible effects);
Gale & Perozek, supra note 128, at 236 (explaining that "the overall effects of estate taxes
depend critically on the recipient's response as well as the donor's").
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harder at accumulating, and if beneficiaries were aware of this fact,
their expectations would not be reduced by the tax, and their labor
efforts would be unchanged. The net effects, therefore, are
indeterminate. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate the dimensions
of the distortions to saving and spending decisions.
1. Macroeconomic Effects
It is not obvious that achieving or maintaining a particular
savings rate should be society's dominant goal. For example, some
kinds of consumption represent investment in human capital that may
be more valuable than accumulations of private capital.214 But even if
we agree that lower savings rates would be bad from a
macroeconomic perspective, it is not at all clear that the estate tax is
responsible for reducing overall savings rates.215 When effects on the
savings of beneficiaries are also taken into account, there may be no
negative overall impact on savings rates as a result of the estate tax;
indeed, the estate tax may increase savings.26 Nor is it obvious that
getting rid of the estate tax is the best way to effect favorable changes
in society-wide savings levels, given that there are other policy tools
available which can also impact capital accumulation."7 All this
suggests that the macroeconomic critique is at least overstated, and
possibly completely off the mark.
2. Utility Losses from Consumption Shifts
A second concern is that an estate tax will trigger personally
costly behavioral shifts. For example, some people will choose to
substitute inter vivos giving for bequests, based on the heavier
taxation of the latter. We can assume that this behavior is costly-
213. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 101, at 377.
214. See id. at 377 (noting that "[s]pending on health care and welfare improve not only
the lives of the poor but also those who care about them and those who might employ a
better-nourished and healthier work force").
215. The argument that the estate tax will reduce savings turns, in part, on the
assumption that the estate tax will induce people to give significant amounts inter vivos to
people (such as their children) who are more likely to spend the money than save it. See
McCaffery, supra note 103, at 1437-38 (presenting a fictional "case study" in which the
parents give the maximum amount each year to their daughters). In reality, few people
take full advantage of these opportunities to reduce transfer tax liability. See supra Part I.
216. See Gale & Perozek, supra note 128 (questioning whether estate taxes reduce
savings); see also Alstott, supra note 101, at 387-88 &,nn.95-98 (emphasizing the lack of
economic consensus on the impact of the estate tax on saving behaviors).
217. See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 23, at 513.
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like eating margarine instead of butter to avoid a tax on butter. 18 The
fact that taxpayers are doing something they prefer less does not do
the government any good. This is an "excess burden" or "deadweight
loss" associated with the tax-a utility loss that the taxpayer suffers
without rendering any corresponding benefit to the government.' 19 In
addition to the cost of following a less-preferred consumption path,
the donor may suffer additional psychological costs, such as the dread
that accompanies thinking about and planning for death."' Unless
there is some reason to think that this change in behavior generates
countervailing benefits for society (a question that is actually
somewhat open in the context of the estate tax),221 it represents a
deadweight loss that we must take seriously.
Yet there is another person in the story whose utility must also
be evaluated in connection with this change in consumption patterns:
the potential recipient. Assume for the moment that the relevant
choice set for the donor includes only two options-bearing the estate
tax by retaining wealth and transferring it by bequest at death, or
switching to a tax-free or tax-discounted inter vivos gift to the same
beneficiary.2  There is reason to believe that the gift in hand would
be more valuable to the recipient than an expected future bequest
that is equivalent when discounted to present value and further
discounted to reflect uncertainty regarding whether the money will be
consumed in the interim or diverted to someone else. This pattern of
preferences would follow if people are risk averse. The greater
uncertainty associated with the bequest makes it less valuable-even
when the expected value (after taking into account that uncertainty)
is equal to that of the gift in hand.
218. See SIMON JAMES & CHRISTOPHER NOBES, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 23 (1996-1997 ed.) (presenting the butter tax
example).
219. Id.
220. Such "dread costs" may impact not only those who ultimately decide to change
their behavior, but also those who end up deciding not to do so after mulling it over.
221. An inter vivos wealth transfer typically helps to decrease inequality (as it goes
from a more wealthy to a less wealthy person). See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 183 (noting
that intergenerational gifts can reduce inequality, at least as between the parties to the
transfer). The structure of the gift tax exemption ($11,000 per person per year)
encourages the broader distribution of wealth among these less wealthy individuals. Thus,
we might say that whatever unhappiness the taxpayer faces as a result of having to follow
the less palatable course is partly made up for by the immediate effect of reducing
inequality. This rationale hearkens back to the "sin tax" way of understanding the estate
tax, considered above. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94.
222. 1 consider the possibility that donors might shift from bequests to some other form
of consumption below. See infra text accompanying notes 224-30.
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The present-day gift might also be preferred if we think that
there are serious imperfections in capital markets that keep potential
recipients from being able to pursue their preferred lifetime pattern
of consumption and investment. Having capital available at an earlier
stage in the life cycle might enable the recipient to take advantage of
utility-enhancing consumption and investment opportunities
(including investment in human capital) that would otherwise be
impossible to finance due to liquidity constraints. 3 Thus, where a
switch from a bequest to an inter vivos gift generates a utility loss for
the donor, it may nonetheless represent a utility-enhancing move for
the recipient. It is not obvious which of these effects would dominate.
Opponents of the estate tax sometimes express concern that
people will react to the tax not only by substituting inter vivos giving
for bequests, but also by substituting other sorts of consumption for
savings. These other sorts of consumption would not feature the
countervailing utility gain to a donee, and hence might more clearly
involve a net utility loss. While raising the price of a given item
through taxation lowers the relative prices of all other items, not all
items are equally plausible substitutes for the taxed item. Thus, we
might expect a butter tax to have a larger impact on the consumption
of close substitutes, such as margarine, than on more distantly
removed products, such as automotive parts or vacation packages. In
the estate tax context, we might expect the closest substitute for a
bequest to be gifts to those same loved ones, or perhaps gifts to a
broader array of loved ones.224 We would not necessarily expect to
see substitution of some unrelated good, such as a yacht.
On the other hand, such unrelated consumption might
conceivably be a better substitute for a bequest than would be an
inter vivos gift if the fact that the donee would be receiving the
money during the donor's lifetime generates additional disutility for
the donor, above and beyond the disutility associated with losing
control of the money during the donor's lifetime. For example, a
donor might fear that the donee's receipt of the money would alter
the ongoing donor-donee relationship or cause other damage to the
223. See Kaplow, supra note 4, at 175 (explaining that gifts and bequests might relieve
liquidity constraints on donees and permit them to make better investments in human
capital, which would ultimately lead to increased productivity). If we assume that a larger
lifetime productivity gain generally accompanies a transfer that relieves the donee of
liquidity constraints earlier in her life, the inter vivos gift would be preferable to the
bequest in this regard.
224. See Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 149 (stating that most distortions in choice that
result from the estate tax "involve making transfers earlier than the testators desire or to a
different beneficiary").
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recipient or the family. Unrelated consumption could be an
important source of deadweight loss if a large number of donors were
believed to have: (1) an aversion to donee receipt of gifts during the
donor's life; (2) a bequest motive (meaning that the donor's aversion
to the donee's receipt of funds expires at the donor's death and is not
a matter of philosophical opposition to inheritance);225 and (3) a weak
enough attachment to the "bequest-control" bundle that an upward
tick in its price would trigger a shift to other consumption.
In addition, there may be people whose wealth accumulations
have nothing to do with a bequest motive, but who nevertheless
believe the estate tax is deeply unfair. These people might not care at
all about getting wealth to their descendants, but might care greatly
about keeping the government from collecting revenue from their
estate. They simply do not want to be "suckered" by the government
by ending up with taxable wealth accumulations at death. For
purposes of depriving the government of estate tax revenues, a
spending spree works just as well as a program of planned inter vivos
giving. Yet this assumes people would be willing to engage in a less
preferred activity (spending, rather than saving) solely to spite the
government. Unlike people who (even in the absence of a tax) would
spend freely on the theory that "you can't take it with you," these
hypothetical people would spend even when they would rather not,
on the theory that "at least the government won't get it." To the
extent this level of anti-government sentiment is really present in
wealthy taxpayers, we should consider the possibility that the
sentiment is largely an artifact of the unfortunate way in which the
estate tax is currently framed.226
Moreover, the type of consumption towards which the estate tax
would push people, even in theory, is that which would dissipate
225. If a person were philosophically opposed to passing wealth to her descendants,
consumption would represent merely the fulfillment of her preferences, not a
"substitution" prompted by the presence of a tax on bequests. It is possible, of course,
that philosophical positions about the suitability of transferring wealth are not wholly
independent of government tax policy-that is, a tax on bequests may affect the way some
people feel about bequests. But the strength and direction of this effect is indeterminate.
For example, a would-be donor who decides that an estate tax makes bequests
prohibitively expensive and bothersome might develop a philosophical objection to
inherited wealth as a way of easing cognitive dissonance. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES
109-24 (1983) (discussing "adaptive preferences," which are shaped by the "feasible set").
Alternatively, an individual who had never given bequesting much thought might have the
matter drawn to her attention by the estate tax and might develop an adamant desire to
bequest-in part, because the tax presents an obstacle to this goal. See id. (discussing
counteradaptive preferences in which objects appear more desirable when they are more
unattainable).
226. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the framing of the estate tax).
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wealth quickly rather than merely convert it into other forms of
wealth. The reason is obvious: Any valuable property remaining at
death (in whatever form) would still be subject to the estate tax.22 ' A
person determined to avoid the estate tax would thus have to go on a
quite specialized spending spree, purchasing only items that can be
immediately consumed, or that depreciate fairly rapidly.228 As a
practical matter, what will these wealthy people consume? Expensive
jewelry is out. Extravagant homes in stylish areas are out. Antique
furnishings are out. Lavish furs and rugs and artwork are out.
Collections of china and silver are out. Fancy automobiles and yachts
are, if not entirely "out," at least questionable-that Lamborghini
may depreciate a bit, but probably not fast enough to entirely thwart
the government.
Gambling would be quite effective. Spending large amounts of
money on medical care or on a retirement home stay would work well
too. Likewise, giving money to charity would be an excellent way to
get rid of money quickly, and presumably this would not trouble
society at all. Another obvious possibility would be to employ a large
number of personal servants to attend to one's every whim-but,
assuming these people were paid in accordance with applicable laws,
we might think this expansion of employment opportunities laudable.
Aside from various categories of illicit purchases (which, we will
assume, can be properly regulated through the applicable criminal
laws), the consumption pattern that will most effectively dissipate
wealth involves eating expensive food, drinking expensive liquor,
going on expensive vacations, buying computer equipment and other
electronic gadgets with an extremely short half-life, consuming
expensive "culture," wearing expensive clothes, and spending lavishly
on items of personal care, such as skin creams, vitamins, facelifts, and
so on. 2 That people would be both willing and able to dissipate large
quantities of wealth in this manner simply to reduce the size of their
227. It is true that some forms of wealth may be more difficult to value objectively and
may therefore offer more opportunities for evading estate taxes than cash or cash
equivalents.
228. See Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 140 (pointing out that individuals who attempt
to consume their wealth "may find that even their attempts at consumption involve
incidental investment qualities that result in further, unintended accumulation").
229. McCaffery fears people would use their money to run for office, which indeed is a
good way of getting rid of money fast. McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 312
(noting the amount of estate taxes Ross Perot saved as a result of his bid for office). But it
is highly questionable whether the prospect of the estate tax would induce many people to
run for office who would otherwise prefer not to do so. It is also unclear why we should be
more troubled by a would-be donor running for office than by his child being enabled to
do the same thing by virtue of receiving a large bequest.
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estates, when they would actually prefer some other consumption
pattern, does not seem terribly likely.23
More plausibly, some people might use the existence of the
estate tax to rationalize indulgent expenditures that they would
otherwise feel guilty about making, but which they would in fact
prefer to make. If behavioral changes are observed as a result of this
dynamic, should it fairly be understood as distortion? If we are
concerned with maximizing utility, then the fact that a tax's existence
helps people engage in a preferred spending pattern without guilt
should be viewed as a positive outcome. This possibility, however,
highlights the need to consider whether changes in savings and
spending decisions occasioned by the estate tax negatively affect
attitudes toward thrift.
3. Impacts on Attitudes Toward Thrift
The last facet of the savings-related criticism focuses on the
psychological impact of the estate tax on virtues of thrift and on
luxury spending decisions. The estate tax is popularly conceived as
one that attacks thrift, and this may account in some measure for its
unpopularity. This dovetails with the more general concern that the
estate tax appears to undercut the ability of family members to
provide lasting security for the family. 3  We might worry that
punishing the thrifty through an estate tax may lead to less thrift
generally in our society, and that this might be a bad thing.232
Significantly, this concern would exist whether or not the ensuing lack
of thrifty attitudes translated into significant macroeconomic impacts
related to reduced savings levels and regardless of whether the
reduction in thriftiness occurred as a result of personally costly
consumption shifts.
Here, it is important to recognize that the population whose
saving and spending behavior may be affected by the estate tax is not
necessarily limited to those who will actually end up being subject to
230. See Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 140 ("[O]ne encounters very little anecdotal
evidence suggesting that the very wealthy embark on spending sprees as a means of
reducing their estates.").
231. See supra Part II.B.3.
232. McCaffery expresses this concern:
The estate tax works like the opposite of 'sin' taxes on goods such as alcohol and
cigarettes, which are (also) not designed to raise resources, but to control
behavior or to curtail certain vices. The estate tax is quite possibly an anti-sin
tax, or, equivalently, a virtue tax. The estate tax is a tax on work and savings, on
thrift, and on altruism.
McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 344; see also Kaplow, supra note 4, at 193
(discussing the view that estate taxation might erode thrift norms).
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the tax. To the extent strong savings norms exist in a society, they can
help to keep family units self-sustaining, which in turn could help
prevent bankruptcy and dependence on governmental programs.
Although the savers whose behavior we ought to be most concerned
about are not those people who are actually subject to the tax, the
consumption decisions of the wealthy may remain relevant. If the
wealthy react to an estate tax by engaging in greater levels of
conspicuous consumption, this could contribute to problematic cycles
of dissatisfaction, overspending, and debt among those who are
unable to keep up with such a lavish lifestyle.233 We might worry
about the effects throughout society of any tax that makes saving
appear less esteemed or valued, given the current low rates of savings
and high rates of debt and personal bankruptcy. A solution to this
problem would focus on fostering appropriate norms about saving
and spending, or what Irving Fisher called monetary "fashions,"
which could have important behavioral and societal impacts.
2 35
This takes us back to a point raised earlier-the possibility that
the estate tax might be used as an excuse for spendthrift choices that
are actually preferred. Could the indulgence of preferences which
might otherwise be suppressed alter the relative value that society
appears to attach to savings and consumption? Advertising similarly
attempts to break down ingrained notions of thrift and austerity in
favor of immediate gratification, and presumably this is not
something we find very troubling. However, the possibility that a
governmental policy might be used as an excuse for abandoning
thrifty behaviors might give us some pause.
One might wonder whether taking this concern with thrift
seriously would require abandoning the estate tax and opting for an
entirely different system of taxation, such as a consumption tax.
236
Wealth only accumulates if someone, at some time, "saves" it; taxing
accumulation means, in this sense, taxing "saving" behavior. But not
233. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 45-63 (1999) (discussing deleterious
effects of competitive cycles of conspicuous consumption).
234. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:
AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000) (analyzing rising personal bankruptcy rates among the
middle class and the societal factors contributing to that phenomenon).
235. See FISHER, supra note 54, at 87-88 (noting that at the time of his writing, fashion
"acts, on the one hand, to stimulate men to save and become millionaires, and, on the
other hand, to stimulate millionaires to live in an ostentatious manner"); id. at 87-89
(noting that changes in customs for accumulating and spending wealth could have
significant effects on the distribution of wealth and the interest rate).
236. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Progressive Taxation and the Incentive Problem, in
DOES ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 15, at 490, 503 (discussing the advantages of a
consumption tax over the current income tax).
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all wealth accumulations are the result of a conscious effort to
exercise thrift; rather, accumulated wealth is sometimes merely that
which the consumer (already satiated with earlier consumption) never
got around to consuming. At some point, consumption stops being
attractive and starts becoming just plain difficult, if not impossible.37
For example, in order to keep from accumulating additional wealth,
Bill Gates would have to spend millions of dollars each day.38
To be sure, wealthy people can exhibit greater or lesser degrees
of thriftiness, and one can draw a distinction between a wealthy
spendthrift character and a virtuously thrifty individual and use these
stock characters to oppose the estate tax. 39 Yet the amount of
accumulated wealth remaining at death tells us nothing about
whether an individual exhibited thrift in life. Some people die with
substantial wealth not because they are truly thrifty, but rather
because their wealth outpaces their capacity to spend. Moreover,
many thrifty individuals never accumulate significant wealth because
their incomes are simply too low; these individuals would not realize
any "reward" from the repeal of the estate tax. In short, the
accumulation of savings can properly be regarded as a luxury that is
much more readily available to the wealthy than to the poor 4.2 11 It is
not necessary to give up on taxing this luxury altogether in order to
promote virtues of thrift in society.
237. See, e.g., Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES
ATLAS SHRUG?, supra note 15, at 465, 476-77 (discussing the proposition that the very
wealthy draw near a satiation point where the "marginal utility of consumption
approaches zero as the level of consumption rises"); Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 140
(discussing difficulties that the very wealthy face in spending wealth more quickly than it
accumulates). Barbara Fried has raised the possibility that consumption itself may be
costly beyond a certain level, and people will fail to engage in it at excessive levels due to
inertia: "Past a certain income/consumption level, consumption itself may not be a normal
good for many people: We run out of easy ideas for things to consume, it takes work to
figure out how to spend a lot of money, and it takes time to spend it." Fried, supra note
22, at 676-77; see also McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 346 ("It is also
interesting to note that, left more or less on their own, people seem to reach a
consumption satiation level.").
238. Carroll, supra note 237, at 476-77 (calculating that Gates would have to spend $25
million per day to avoid additional wealth accumulations, based on press accounts placing
Gates's net worth at $100 billion and assuming a ten percent annual rate of return).
239. See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 126, at 342-45 (presenting the example of
Ms. Thrifty and Mr. Spendthrift to illustrate unfair effects of the estate tax on thrifty
individuals).
240. See Carroll, supra note 237, at 481 (concluding that the rich "choose to save more
and to accumulate faster because they can 'afford' the luxury of doing so"); Hirsch, supra
note 4, at 30 & n.105 (noting that saving has the characteristics of a luxury good); Shefrin
& Thaler, supra note 48, at 110 ("To the poor, saving is a luxury.").
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C. Avoidance Costs
Another objection focuses on costs associated with efforts to
avoid the estate tax. Even if the estate tax does not cause people to
substitute earlier transfers or other forms of consumption for the
bequest-control bundle, it does notoriously impel many people to
engage in other sorts of complicated estate tax avoidance activities.
Not only does this introduce additional deadweight losses (the money
paid to accountants and tax attorneys to structure one's affairs in the
manner that will minimize one's estate tax liability),"' it also arguably
has unfortunate distributive consequences. Insofar as the more
sophisticated estate tax avoidance techniques are available only to the
"super rich," one might argue that these opportunities make the tax
unfair.242 The availability of such devices arguably make the tax less
progressive (or more regressive) within the range to which it
applies.243
An initial response would be to note that if such avoidance
techniques are deemed to have unfortunate consequences (either
from a deadweight loss perspective, or from the perspective of tax
equity), the estate tax could simply be tightened up to eliminate these
opportunities.24 Whether or not doing so makes sense depends on a
number of factors, including the administrative and enforcement costs
associated with the change, the amount of additional revenue it would
241. See, e.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 151-54 (discussing and estimating the
magnitude of "direct costs of estate planning," which include professional fees and related
expenses). Estate planners interviewed by Schmalbeck estimated that approximately half
of their work would be required even in the absence of transfer taxes. Id. at 152.
242. The same basic argument is often mounted against tax shelters in the income tax
context. See David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance
Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 109 (2002) (observing that "[a] common claim is
that tax shelters reduce the progressivity of the tax system because they are available only
to the rich").
243. The very wealthiest fraction of those paying the estate tax are responsible for a
disproportionate amount of the revenues collected. See Poterba, supra note 3, at 241-42
& tbl.2 (reporting that in 1995, estates over $20 million accounted for only 0.7% of the
estate tax returns but accounted for 17% of estate tax payments; in contrast, estates valued
at between $600,000 and $1 million made up 44% of the returns but accounted for less
than 6% of the revenue). Of course, it is still possible that the extremely wealthy are
paying a smaller percentage of their (extraordinarily large) estates in estate taxes than are
the less wealthy.
244. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive
Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391, 1398 (2002) (book review) ("[Tlax avoidance techniques
can in theory be addressed by making the tax base more comprehensive and enforcement
more effective."). For example, the Treasury Department recently announced that a
scheme for avoiding estate taxes that had been used by thousands of wealthy individuals
was invalid. See David Cay Johnston, U.S. Bans a Scheme to Avoid Estate Tax With Life
Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at Al.
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yield, and the impact it would have on taxpayer choices and utility.245
This requires making predictions about what the taxpayers currently
availing themselves of existing avoidance opportunities would do if
those options were eliminated.246 Would they generally choose to
leave bequests and bear the tax? If so, eliminating the avoidance
opportunities would raise revenues and reduce the amount of
behavioral distortion occurring as a result of the tax.247 On the other
hand, it is possible that the withdrawal of sophisticated avoidance
techniques would drive more people to give or consume inter vivos
rather than bear the estate tax-or to seek out even more arcane and
complex avoidance arrangements.24 To take one extreme case, if
everyone fully substituted avoidance through tax-free inter vivos
consumption and gifts for the other forms of avoidance currently
available, revenues would not increase at all. Yet donors would be
worse off than in the world where the original avoidance techniques
were available.24 The only possible up-side would be countervailing
utility gains to donees or to society as a result of the behavioral shift.
Moreover, it is not clear that present avoidance opportunities
make the estate tax less progressive than it would otherwise be.20 If
current tax schedules were formulated with present opportunities for
tax avoidance in mind, removal of the tax avoidance opportunities
245. See generally Weisbach, supra note 242 (presenting an economic framework for
analyzing anti-tax avoidance doctrines).
246. See id. at 97-99 (presenting a stylized example involving the taxation of three
varieties of fruit, which illustrates this point). To put the point in economic terms, we
would want to examine the cross-elasticities of three goods: the bequest-control bundle,
the structures of wealth that are presently untaxed (that is, the avoidance opportunities),
and the inter vivos use or gifting of wealth. If people are currently using sophisticated
avoidance techniques as a substitute for the taxable bequest-control bundle, but do not
view inter vivos use or gifting of wealth as an attractive alternative to the current
avoidance techniques, then taxation of the structures which presently receive favored tax
treatment would be more likely to induce shifts back to the bequest-control bundle than to
induce shifts to inter vivos use of wealth. See id. at 99 (observing that taxing pears as well
as apples while leaving bananas untaxed is likely to be a good idea if pears are a better
substitute for apples than they are for bananas).
247. See id. at 103 (observing that "[a]nti-avoidance doctrines that cause taxpayers to
shift back to nonavoidance behaviors and, therefore, raise significant revenue are likely to
be more efficient").
248. See id. (observing that "anti-avoidance doctrines that merely induce taxpayers to
shift their behaviors toward worse shelters without raising significant revenues (by causing
taxpayers to shift toward nonavoidance behaviors) are inefficient").
249. See id. at 99 (noting that the strengthening of anti-avoidance doctrines will
decrease individual utility by constraining choice, holding all else equal).
250. See id. at 109 (explaining that "[i]f tax shelters were reduced, the extra revenue
could be used to reduce other taxes on the rich" and recognizing the possibility that "the
existing marginal rate structure might already take into account the existence of tax
shelters").
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might not actually make the tax more progressive; these changes
might instead be matched by a flattening of the marginal tax rates."'
Nevertheless, the existence and salience of opportunities for
avoidance may contribute to the public distaste for the estate tax in a
way that changes in marginal rates would not. As discussed above,
people may feel uniquely "suckered" by the estate tax if they believe
that others are able to make use of avoidance techniques that they
cannot utilize.2 Because beliefs about the taxes paid by others can
play a significant role in public attitudes towards taxation, and can
affect compliance levels,253 tightening up avoidance opportunities
might make sense from this perspective. Sorting out these issues is
difficult, but my point here is a simple one: The current existence of
sophisticated tax avoidance techniques does not rule out the viability
of the estate tax as a policy tool because these techniques can be
addressed to the extent that doing so makes sense.
In any event, the problems presented by avoidance techniques
are not unique to the estate tax. For example, when the stepped-up
basis on assets transferred at death is eliminated along with the estate
tax,"' we might expect many of the avoidance efforts currently poured
into reducing estate tax liability to simply be shifted into avoiding the
income tax on capital gains. Likewise, other costs associated with the
estate tax, such as those relating to compliance and enforcement, also
exist with other taxes. It does not appear that these categories of cost
are larger in the case of the estate tax than they are in the case of an
income tax; indeed, they may be smaller.5 My point here is not to
251. Id.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
253. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 142, at 177 (observing that "[w]hile the relationship
between tax attitudes and tax evasion is not a simple one, we can be confident in our
general prediction that if tax attitudes become worse, tax evasion will increase"); Huang &
Wu, supra note 167, at 401-02 (discussing literature on tax evasion and the role played by
perceptions of equity and of other taxpayers' compliance); Weisbach, supra note 242, at
111 (noting the potential impact on taxpayer compliance played by social norms and a
given taxpayer's perceptions of the compliance of other taxpayers).
254. See EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 541, 115 Stat. 38, 76 (repealing I.R.C. § 1014
with respect to decedents dying after December 31, 2009); id. § 542, 115 Stat. at 76-86
(adding I.R.C. §§ 1022, 6716 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1040, 1618, 1619); id. § 901, 115 Stat.
at 150 (providing a sunset for this change of December 31, 2010).
255. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 31, at 116 (observing that "probably because in this
country the transfer of any significant amount of wealth at death is next to impossible
without the involvement of both lawyers and the court system, the estate tax traditionally
has been one of the easiest taxes to enforce"); Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 154-55
(explaining that the "public costs of administering and policing the transfer tax system
seem modest"). Schmalbeck discusses one study that estimates administrative and
compliance costs for the estate tax at about six to seven percent of revenue generated;
earlier work had generated estimates of ten percent for individual and corporate income
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present a comprehensive comparison of the estate tax with other
taxes, but rather to suggest that the estate tax may be a more
promising tool of redistribution than is sometimes supposed.
Eliminating the tax based on an assumption that it is unduly distortive
of individual choices seems premature.
IV. NEW LIFE FOR THE ESTATE TAX?
In this last part of the Article, I want to sketch out some possible
policy directions indicated by the foregoing analysis. My reason for
doing so is not so much to convince readers of the merits of any
particular proposal, but rather to convince readers that proposals of
this sort are worth making. If we can agree that furthering equality of
opportunity is something that we as a society desire, and that some
amount of redistribution is necessary to achieve this, the question
then becomes how best (that is, at lowest cost per unit of progress) to
achieve it. The discussion above suggests that the estate tax may have
some significant advantages in this regard, but it is also the focus of
significant popular opposition. Much of that opposition can be
attributed to the interplay of the current design details with cognitive
phenomena. But a reformulated and properly targeted estate tax
could not only be politically viable, but could also make the
expenditures to which it might best be linked (such as those designed
to enhance opportunities for the less well-off) more palatable.
I have in mind two sets of changes. The first involves framing. I
propose directly linking the estate tax to, and earmarking its revenues
for, specific opportunity-enhancing programs. In addition, I suggest
taking more advantage of the opportunity to frame the tax as an
offset against a larger gain (the bequest). The second set of changes
addresses concerns about security and savings. I propose making the
estate tax sensitive to choices people make about consuming and
saving. In addition, I suggest that people be given the opportunity to
pre-pay wealth transfer taxes on major illiquid assets if they wish to
protect their heirs from the possibility of having to sell such assets to
pay the estate tax. Although I present these changes as a package,
each could work as a stand-alone reform.
taxes, and two to five percent for sales taxes. Id. at 155 (citing Charles Davenport & Jay
A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 TAX NOTES 619, 622-23 (1999)); Joel
Slemrod, Which is the Simplest Tax System of Them All?, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 355,368-74 (Henry Aaron & William Gale eds., 1996).
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A. Reframing the Estate Tax
1. Taxing to Enhance Opportunities
The first step in reframing the estate tax is to discard the rhetoric
about destroying accumulations of wealth and dragging people back
to the starting gate, and replace it with a focus on the societal benefits
associated with increasing equality of opportunity for the less well-off.
Helping the less well-off compete gets to the heart of the problem
with inequality of opportunity-the squandering of human potential.
The next step is to identify some specific governmental programs
that further equality of opportunity (or invent new ones that will
further that goal) and separate this slate of programs from those
benefits funded through other revenue efforts, such as the income tax.
The obvious candidates are programs to help children and young
people achieve their potential. Here, we might consider those
programs which are popularly denoted as "welfare." When one
compares the amount and character of the revenue yielded by the
estate tax with the amount and character of the expenditures
necessary to fund welfare programs, one is struck by the symmetry.
Federal block grants to the states to enable them to run their welfare
programs amount to $16.5 billion annually.256 In 2000, the estate tax
netted almost $25 billion; estate and gift taxes together netted almost
$29 billion.257 The projected 2001 revenue collections from transfer
taxes were about $30.5 billion.258 Thus, it is not unreasonable to think
that the estate tax could generate sufficient revenues to fund
programs that would significantly enhance the opportunities available
to the less well-off.
The philosophical symmetry is as stunning as is the financial.
Money would be transferred from the children of the very wealthy to
the children of the very poor. The former, who grew up enjoying all
the advantages money can buy, would have their unearned fortunes
trimmed back just a bit to permit the latter, who were born unlucky,
to have some semblance of a fair start in life. The usual complaints
about the poor idly luxuriating in unearned benefits should lose a bit
of force when the money the poor are receiving comes from
256. HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM., 2000 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION
OF WAYS AND MEANS 352 (2000) (describing the Block Grant Program of Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families), available at http://utdallas/edu-jargo/green2000/
Section_7.pdf.
257. See supra note 145.
258. Schmalbeck, supra note 11, at 156.
20031
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
individuals who did nothing to earn it either. We might expect
taxpayer hostility towards welfare to diminish once it is funded with
unearned fortunes, not hard-earned wages. On the other hand, it
might be foolhardy to link something as historically unpopular as
"welfare" with something as unpopular as the estate tax. It might
offer too easy a target to opponents, who could claim to "kill two
birds with one stone" by eliminating both at the same time. Perhaps a
better approach would be to fund specific opportunity-enhancing
programs that complement the core public assistance program. One
possibility would be to use estate tax revenues to fund a government-
sponsored loan program designed to redress the imperfections in the
capital market that constrain the poor from making optimal
investments in human capital.259 In any case, the idea of linking the
estate tax to programs designed to help poor children and young
people achieve their potential makes good sense.
The concept of earmarking is a familiar one that has been used to
much advantage by charitable organizations. People who might be
reluctant to contribute to a general pot of money for doing a random
assortment of vaguely good things might well contribute money to
provide assistance to a particular starving child, or to supply building
materials to volunteer workers constructing homes for the poor in
one's hometown, or to add books to their alma mater's library. The
more specifically-targeted the donation, and the more control the
donor feels over the expenditure, the more the transaction is framed
as a contribution to a cognizable good, rather than merely as a drain
on the donor's resources.' 60 As helpful as earmarking might be for
fundraising, however, one might object that requiring money to be
used for specified purposes impedes the optimal allocation of funds.
Indeed, charities often settle for the illusion of earmarking. For
example, Defenders of Wildlife urges people to "adopt a wolf" by
making a donation of a particular amount of money, but the charity
does not claim (nor could anyone reasonably think) that the donation
will actually go to help a specific individual animal-although
presumably the funds are earmarked for programs to help wolves
generally.26'
259. See Fennell, supra note 187, at 325-28 (proposing such a loan program).
260. Sometimes earmarking is carried even further, when charitable organizations not
only specify the particular ends your contribution will serve (e.g., life-saving rehydration
fluids for one hundred impoverished children) but also suggest the discretionary
expenditures you might forgo on a daily basis to finance the contribution (e.g., a side order
of french fries).
261. See Defenders of Wildlife, Adopt a Wolf, at http://www.defenders.org/adopt/wolf/
adopt.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
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In the tax context, we might similarly worry that earmarking
specific revenues for specific purposes would prevent budget
authorities from allocating revenues optimally and flexibly.262
Economists, however, have done some interesting work on
earmarking that suggests the practice may not necessarily generate
inefficiencies.263 For example, James Buchanan has suggested that
earmarking could be beneficial from the standpoint of individual
participation in collective decision-making about public services.2"
When citizens make decisions about the funding of a bundled
package of goods, they may be forced to accept more than they want
of some goods in the bundle, and less than they want of other goods
in the bundle; in contrast, earmarking "provides a means of
compartmentalizing fiscal decisions., 265 De facto earmarking already
occurs whenever a particular taxing authority, such as a local school
district, is given power to fund only particular government
functions.2 Earmarking, therefore, may offer a useful way of framing
tax-and-spending decisions, without necessarily introducing any
267inefficiencies.
Significantly, the estate tax should be presented as a necessary
and appropriate way of paying for these particular opportunity-
enhancing programs, not as an end in itself. In this manner, the estate
tax could be transformed from a wealth-destroying tax that
incidentally raises a pittance of nonspecific revenue into a favored
mechanism for providing opportunity-enhancing programs to society.
None of these adjustments of the estate tax "frame" involves a
(displaying a photograph of a baby wolf and offering readers the opportunity to "adopt a
small, precious wolf pup like 'Promise' today").
262. See Buchanan, supra note 204, at 457 (noting the "near-universal condemnation of
the institution [of earmarking] by experts in budgetary theory and practice"); see also
Bracewell-Milnes, supra note 197, at 46 (listing objections to earmarking frequently found
in the public finance literature).
263. For an overview of work on this topic, see JAMES & NOBES, supra note 218, at
136-37. See also Bracewell-Milnes, supra note 197, at 48-50 (questioning the standard
objections to earmarking and suggesting that earmarking could be efficient); Buchanan,
supra note 204, at 458 (observing that the standard models used to generate these critiques
use the budgetary authorities' judgments as a reference point, rather than those of citizens,
and questioning whether that is the appropriate reference point).
264. Buchanan, supra note 204.
265. Id. at 458; see also id. at 462 (providing a more detailed analysis).
266. See id. at 458.
267. One practical consideration that argues against earmarking in the present context
is the very tenuousness of the estate tax's existence. See Bracewell-Milnes, supra note 197,
at 87 ("[T]he best taxes to earmark are those with an unlimited life expectancy, and not
those which are candidates for early abolition or whose longer-term future is in doubt.").
On the other hand, it is possible that earmarking the tax could be influential in securing its
long-term future.
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substantive change. The relative positions of the more well-off and
the less well-off can be just as effectively equalized by destroying the
advantages of the more well-off as by enhancing the opportunities of
the less well-off. Moreover, taxing the more well-off will have the
same "destructive" impact on accumulations of wealth whether the
goal is destroying wealth or paying for opportunity-enhancing
benefits. Finally, a dollar of revenue buys the same amount of
government services, whether it is dropped in a large revenue bucket
268or earmarked for a special opportunity-enhancing program.
Nevertheless, these small changes in "frame" would, I believe, utterly
transform the public perception of the estate tax and turn it into a
viable redistributive mechanism. It would also help to improve the
public image of "welfare" programs by reminding taxpayers that
these programs are, in fact, designed to help achieve the ideal of
equality of opportunity.
Some additional refinements would help to complete the
transformation. The program (both the "taxing" and the "spending"
halves of it) should be given a descriptive name that repositions the
package not just as a tax, but rather as a productive program that
offers real benefits to society. For example, we might name it the
Linked Estate and Gift Assessment for Children and Youth
("LEGACY"). Programs funded by the tax revenues would be
identified by this name and would enter common parlance (e.g.,
"we've got some LEGACY money for this project," or "I am
applying for a LEGACY grant" or "my child received a LEGACY
scholarship"). Emphasizing the purposes of a tax rather than (or at
least in addition to) the fact that it is a tax can make a large difference
in the way the tax is perceived . 9  Creating a program with name
recognition would enable people to mentally associate the tax with
some familiar and tangible benefits. Decisions about the estate tax
would no longer involve simply accepting or rejecting the estate tax
qua tax; rather, such decisions would implicate all the programs
funded under LEGACY.
In addition, we could consider giving the donor the chance to
make an election in her will as to which of several opportunity-
268. Of course, the number of such dollars available may vary depending on how
revenues and services are linked.
269. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1873 ("[I]ndividuals may think about matters
easily assimilated as 'taxes' differently from other matters and may think about different
taxes differently; the nature of one's evaluation function itself depends on the cognitive
label."); cf. THALER, supra note 22, at 119 ("Reverse mortgages (in which a bank buys a
house from an elderly family, lets them live in it, and pays them an annuity) have been
extremely unpopular, in part, I think, because they are called mortgages.").
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enhancing programs she would like the taxes on her estate to fund . 7
This would give the donor an active role in leaving a legacy to society
and would be consistent with the choices that already exist for leaving
wealth to charities. 1 The more a tax looks like a voluntary choice
rather than a compelled confiscation, the more palatable it is likely to
be. 2 Even if one doubts that a wealthy taxpayer could ever view the
estate tax with anything other than outright hatred, this way of
positioning the tax may have a transformative impact on the attitudes
of a larger and potentially more politically powerful group-the vast
majority of taxpayers who will never have to pay the tax at all.
With these changes, many people would no longer view the
estate tax as a mechanism pitting a donor against the government, but
rather as a mechanism for enhancing equality of opportunity. In
other words, the tax would have clear winners, not just losers. In
contemplating paying the tax, people would no longer envision a
faceless governmental bureaucrat pouring dollars down a drain, but
rather the programs that are supported by the revenues.
2. Framing the Tax As a Gain-Reducer, Not a Loss-Creator
In addition to reframing the estate tax as a generator of
identifiable societal benefits, we might also explore ways to better
frame the tax as a "gain-reducer" rather than as a "loss creator."
Because people tend to find a loss more painful than a failure to
secure an equivalent gain 2 3 a frame that presents the tax as reducing
a gain rather than generating a loss might be expected to make the
tax more palatable. This could, in turn, decrease both the utility loss
and enforcement costs associated with it. The timing of the estate tax
makes it well-suited to a "gain reducing" frame, because the loss of
270. Such "tax earmarking" programs have been implemented on a limited scale in
Canada; taxpayers in some provinces can choose to earmark taxes for either public schools
or separate school boards. See Marc Bilodeau, Tax-earmarking and Separate School
Financing, 54 J. PUB. ECON. 51, 52 (1994) (discussing earmarking in Canada). See
generally id. (discussing circumstances under which limited earmarking might be feasible).
271. It is possible that individuals who were philosophically opposed to all of the
choices available under the LEGACY program would be motivated to shift their bequests
in the direction of additional charitable contributions. To the extent these charitable
contributions translate into goods and services that would otherwise be funded through
taxes, this shift may not impose a significant social cost. It is also worth remembering that
a choice to leave more money to charity means leaving less money to one's beneficiaries
than would otherwise be possible. This fact presumably explains why people are willing to
pay estate taxes under the present system, rather than leave all of their money to a charity
of their choice.
272. See Bracewell-Milnes, supra note 197, at 55 (discussing gains associated with
"making taxes less like compulsory payments and more like voluntary ones").
273. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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the tax could be integrated into the larger gain of the bequest.27 ' This
might not work, however, if the beneficiary immediately adjusted his
baseline upward to account for the bequest. Estate taxes are due nine
months after the date of death, providing a reasonable interval for a
beneficiary to adjust to the pre-tax bequest amount before the taxes
are actually paid. In such an instance, the tax might well be perceived
as a loss from the newly-increased baseline rather than merely as a
reduction in a gain.
If beneficiaries did not have an opportunity to adjust their
baselines upward before paying the estate tax, this would more
squarely position the tax as a "gain-reducer." To take the extreme
(and obviously unacceptable) case, we might imagine a world in
which donors and beneficiaries are given no information about the
estate taxes that may be levied. Instead, the estate's assets go directly
into a government escrow account, and then some weeks or months
later each beneficiary would receive a government check for the value
of the bequest, net of the (undisclosed) estate taxes. If we could set
aside the general outrage that would be generated by such a scheme,
the beneficiary would probably experience the government check as a
gain, having no baseline against which to assess it.275
A slightly less fanciful alternative would be to announce that
estate tax rates will be set randomly after death, so that nobody
would know ahead of time the rate of taxation that would be
applied.276 To the extent this complicated the decision set facing a
potential donor, it might result in fewer attempts at liability
reduction. To the extent it tempered the expectations of a potential
recipient (effectively blurring the baseline against which the eventual
inheritance would be evaluated) such an alternative might cause the
bequest-net-of-taxes package to be viewed as a gain rather than a
loss. While such a tax is not a realistic option,277 the role of
uncertainty and its link to framing is important to recognize. For
example, the uncertainty generated by the clumsy set of annual
274. See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 39 (Richard H. Thaler
ed., 1991) (discussing greater palatability of losses that are integrated into larger gains, as
are payroll reductions).
275. This'scenario assumes that beneficiaries will not have independent knowledge
about the size of the estate and their bequested share of it. This is likely not a realistic
assumption in some category of cases.
276. See Jolls, supra note 4, at 1674 (discussing probabilistic taxes).
277. See id. (noting the political infeasibility of probabilistic taxes); Stiglitz, supra note
209, at 1013 (discussing the unlikelihood that a "randomized" tax could ever be
implemented in a democracy-in part because of fears that "a random tax would not in
fact be random, that the die would be loaded in favor of those in political power").
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reforms and eventual phase-out and resurrection of the estate tax
may end up having many of the same effects that a probabilistic estate
tax might have. 8
More realistically, we might imagine replacing the current estate
tax collection system with one that operates on a principle similar to
payroll withholding. For example, banks, financial institutions, and
life insurance companies might be required to withhold and submit to
the IRS a set percentage of each decedent's holdings before releasing
the balance to the executor, unless the executor provides an affidavit
certifying that the estate's total assets are less than the current
exemption amount or that deductions will be taken (such as the
unlimited deduction for transfers to spouses) that will render the
estate nontaxable. To avoid hardship, there could be special
exemptions from estate tax withholding for which an executor could
apply in extraordinary circumstances, such as where the vast majority
of the estate is held in large illiquid assets and all of the liquid assets
279are necessary to meet immediate short-term needs of the survivors.
Provision could also be made, in accordance with state law, for a
particular apportionment scheme or for designation of payment of
estate taxes from a particular account, again making use of affidavits
278. Cf. Stiglitz, supra note 209, at 1013 (discussing the possibility that "some of the
properties of optimal tax structures may reflect an attempt to introduce randomization
surreptitiously"). For general background on the uncertainty resulting from the recent
estate tax reforms, see, e.g., Johnston, supra note 5. Taxpayers might react to the added
complexity with either apathy or increased attention. On the one hand, when a task
becomes too complex, people may react by simply giving up. McCaffery explains how this
might occur in the tax context:
Learned helplessness refers to the fact that individuals, when repeatedly
confronted with stressful or difficult situations, 'learn' to become helpless-an
ironic inversion of what we take a learning process to be. Complex taxes provide
a fertile testing ground for the effect. My sense is that a good many individuals
have learned to be helpless vis-a-vis the tax system; that is, they have given up
altogether the formidable task of understanding the law, even as it applies to
them.
McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1925. On the other hand, it is possible that the frequent
changes in the law will raise the saliency of the estate tax issue and lead to heightened
planning and avoidance efforts.
279. Relatively illiquid types of property (personal residences, real estate, real estate
partnerships, closely held stock, farm assets, limited partnerships, other noncorporate
businesses, depletable/intangibles, art, and the catch-all category "other assets") together
made up just under 30% of the gross estate value reflected on 1998 taxable estate tax
returns. See Gale & Slemrod, supra note 107, at 9-11 & tbl.1.3 (showing percentages of
different categories of property held by estates, broken down by estate size, based on 1998
IRS data).
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to secure release of funds from the other financial institutions. ° If
more fine-tuning were necessary, the withholding percentage could
itself be calibrated based on the executor's sworn estimates of the size
of the estate. The same percentage could be withheld from the
proceeds generated by the executor's sale of real estate, business
interests, and other large assets, where such sales occurred before the
estate tax return was filed.
Setting up the system in this manner would effectively remove
the money from the scene before beneficiaries had a chance to adjust
their baselines upward as a result of the bequest .2 1 The actual filing
of the estate tax return would require little or no additional payment
or might actually generate a refund if most of the estate's wealth were
held in liquid assets. As a result, we might expect such filings to be
more prompt and less distressing than is presently the case. Indeed,
instances of estate tax evasion might be expected to fall as fewer
taxpayers were faced with the prospect of paying a positive balance
due.
282
The problem of premature baseline adjustment might persist,
however, in estates where most of the wealth is held in the form of
large illiquid assets. To the extent a beneficiary immediately adjusted
her baseline upward to encompass "mom's ranch" or "dad's art
collection," the prospect of having to sell that illiquid asset in order to
pay estate taxes on it would likely be perceived as a loss-and
perhaps a very painful one, if sentimental value is attached to the
asset. Indeed, a beneficiary's baseline might well include the asset
long before the death of the donor. Here, we might think of the trite
image of a parent and child together surveying the family mansion
and grounds, the family business, or the family farm, while the parent
solemnly intones "one day all this will be yours." To the extent such
conversations really occur (and to the extent estate taxation really
280. See Mary E. Hitt, Note, Estate of Reno v. Commissioner: One Step Beyond
Apportionment?, 48 U. PITr. L. REV. 1093, 1097-1102 (1987) (discussing state law
approaches to apportionment of the estate tax burden).
281. It is possible, especially where the executor will be a primary beneficiary, that
withholding might be experienced as a loss (perhaps as a lot of little losses). Yet it seems
plausible that the loss associated with the withholding system would be bundled together
with the larger gain (the release of the balance of the asset to the executor) in much the
way that payroll withholding seems to be cognitively bundled with the larger gain of
receiving the pay.
282. Cf. Carroll, supra note 163, at 517 (discussing research showing that people who
owe positive income tax balances on April 15 delay preparing their tax returns and expend
more time and energy finding ways to lower their taxes). For an analysis of compliance
with the estate tax generally, see Martha Britton Eller et al., Noncompliance with the
Federal Estate Tax, in RETHINKING, supra note 4, at 375.
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operates to dash the expectations of the child in this story), it will be
difficult to recast taxation of these important assets as mere "gain
reductions." However, the possibility that people could "pre-pay"
wealth taxes on large illiquid assets-a point addressed below2 3 -
might provide at least a partial answer to this framing dilemma.
B. Valuing Thrift and Security
1. Making the Estate Tax Thrift-Sensitive
If, as argued above, we are concerned with supporting thrift as a
societal value, the challenge is to find a way to interject support of
thriftiness into the estate tax framework. Of course, it remains an
open normative question whether encouraging thrift (which means, in
some sense, burdening consumption) is a good idea." Yet because
estate tax opponents often focus on the importance of rewarding
thrift (or at least not punishing it), the possibility that the estate tax
could be made thrift-sensitive is worth investigating. One way to do
this would be to allow people to earn estate tax exemptions by
engaging in low-consumption, high-savings behaviors over a lifetime.
The point would not be to shield all savings, but rather only that
category of savings that represented a conscious and exceptional
choice to forgo consumption in favor of providing additional security
for one's family.
To make the estate tax sensitive to consumption choices, the
government might calculate an annual consumption benchmark that
represents a suitably thrifty existence for each family size and
geographical area. By consuming less than that benchmark level in a
given year, individuals could earn additional annual estate tax
exemptions of some standardized amount (such as $50,000). The
household's annual consumption level could be derived by
subtracting new savings from annual income (putting aside the
complications associated with debt). The exemptions earned in this
manner would be "banked" under the taxpayer's social security
number and could be used to make tax-free gifts or to offset any
future estate tax liability. In this fashion, savings accomplished
through low consumption would be rewarded; savings accompanied
283. See infra Part IV.B.2.
284. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 149, at 99-103, 109-12 (discussing arguments
for and against taxing consumption).
285. See Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51
TAX L. REV. 615, 625 (1996) ("[I]f Income equals Consumption plus Savings (I = C + S),
then Consumption equals Income minus Savings (C = 1- S).").
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by higher consumption levels would not be. The choice of extreme
thrift would be available even to the wealthy, if they valued thrift as a
good in itself, or had a strong desire to leave tax-free bequests.
Of particular importance in the present context, people could
earn these exemptions regardless of income level. People who
consumed very little because they earned very little would receive an
exemption just as would someone who earned a great deal and
consumed very little. People who became wealthy after years of low
income and low consumption would be able to shield more of their
wealth than would someone who had always consumed at a relatively
high level. Thus, people with relatively modest incomes who run little
risk of ever being subject to the estate tax would receive further
assurance of that fact by "banking" large numbers of exemptions over
their lifetimes. The person who lives a "rags to riches" story or builds
a profitable business from the ground up will most likely be able to
pass wealth tax-free to a second generation.286 Because of these
effects, the unfairness often associated with the estate tax would be
reduced, and popular opposition could be expected to wane.
There would be another salutary effect of this approach: It
would make societal inequities palpable, particularly for those who
are more well-off. By, for example, tying the consumption
benchmark to the median consumption of a family of similar size
living in that region, this system could raise awareness about the
resource constraints faced by the less well-off. Although it seems
extremely unlikely that very many well-off people would actually
consume below such a benchmark, those who gave the possibility
even a moment's thought might learn something in the process. For
example, some well-off individuals might come to understand that
their own continued wealth is not so much a function of extraordinary
thrift, but rather a function of extraordinary resource levels.
2. Buying Security by Pre-Paying the Estate Tax
As noted above, special concerns are raised by large, illiquid
assets of great sentimental value, such as small businesses and family
farms. Although the actual instances in which estate tax liability
286. In this respect, my proposal bears some resemblance to that of Eugenio Rignano.
Rignano believed that transfer taxes should be calibrated to reflect the extent to which the
transferred wealth represented the work and thrift of the decedent, with newly created
wealth taxed lightly on transfer, wealth that had been transferred once before taxed more
heavily, and wealth that had been transferred twice or more before confiscated entirely.
EUGENIO RIGNANO, THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INHERITANCE TAX 34 (1924);
see also HERBERT KIESLING, TAXATION AND PUBLIC GOODS: A WELFARE-ECONOMIC
CRITIQUE OF TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 157-59 (1992) (discussing Rignano's work).
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forces a sale of an important family asset are relatively rare, the
symbolic and emotional freight attaching to such a possibility is
enormous.' Because dread of such forced sales fuels much of the
opposition to the estate tax, providing a mechanism for removing that
dread would be quite valuable in improving the public image of the
estate tax. 8
One vehicle for achieving that goal would be to permit pre-
payment of estate taxes for important, illiquid assets. There are
several ways this might be accomplished. The simplest would be to
permit people to purchase estate tax exemptions (say, in $50,000
increments) for a price that is based on a particular estate tax rate and
discounted to present value based on actuarial data. Thus, an
individual with a life expectancy of an additional thirty years could
immunize a given increment of wealth at a lower price than could an
individual with an additional ten years of life expectancy. Wealthy
parents could purchase exemptions for their young children at heavily
discounted rates. To make this scheme more closely track the estate
tax rate schedule and to avoid abuse of the pre-payment option, the
marginal rate on each additional exemption could be increased
incrementally in accordance with the tax code. These purchased
exemptions could be tracked by social security number, along with
any exemptions earned through low consumption. 9
While there are innumerable details that would have to be
addressed in order to operationalize this idea, one important matter
should be addressed: whether these exemptions would be refundable
or transferable. Given human optimism and general uncertainty
about the growth of wealth and the timing of death, some people
might buy extra tax exemptions and end up not needing to use them.
Another possibility is that the estate tax will no longer be in effect at
the time of death, and that the exemption will turn out to have been
unnecessary. What should happen in that instance? Should the heirs
receive a refund? If so, how should it be calculated? Alternatively,
should they be able to keep the estate tax exemption for their own
future use? The way in which these issues are to be handled would
287. See Blatt, supra note 129, at 315 (describing the symbolic importance of family
businesses in estate tax debates).
288. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1168 (2002)
(reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000) (explaining that when
"baseless fear" cannot be dispelled through education and information, government
"might be well advised to regulate ... not to reduce the risk (which may be infinitesimal)
but to quell the fear")).
289. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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have important implications for the viability of any such pre-payment
program.
For ideas on how to handle these issues, we might look at the
experience with other pre-payment plans, such as prepaid tuition
plans.2 ° While plan details vary from state to state, refunds of the
amount paid in (less various administrative fees) are generally
available, and many plans pay some amount of interest as well.291
Refunds are likely to be even more important in the estate tax
context. Unlike tuition rates, which are almost certain to rise in the
future, estate tax rates are politically contingent and subject to change
in either direction at any time. If we wish to encourage pre-payment
of taxes, a viable approach would be to permit refunds of all taxes
that were prepaid, at any time and for any reason, perhaps even with
some amount of interest built in. In addition, the exemptions might
be transferable to other family members if the person for whom the
exemption was originally obtained dies without leaving behind an
estate for which the exemption is needed. However, if the tax were
discounted to present value based on actuarial data, exemptions could
not be sold or transferred to other people inter vivos-otherwise,
young people could buy exemptions at low, discounted rates and
transfer them to older people who are much closer to death.292
A related problem would arise if there were significant
disparities between actuarial accounts of additional years to live and
an individual's own information about personal life expectancy. For
example, a person who has just been diagnosed with terminal,
290. These plans are known as "529 plans," after the Internal Revenue Code provision
that grants them tax-advantaged status. See I.R.C. § 529 (Lexis 2001). These plans now
exist or are under development in every state. See Jim Hamilton, Notice 2001-55 and
Rapid Growth of Qualified Tuition Programs, 93 TAx NOTES 988 (2001) (discussing the
growth and history of 529 plans).
291. See Sarah Max, College Plans for the Risk Averse, CNNmoney, Feb. 20, 2002, at
http://money.com/2002/02/20/college/q-529prepaid/ (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). For example, College Illinois offers prepaid tuition plans that can be cancelled
for a refund of the amounts paid, less application fees, plus (after the first three years)
interest compounded at two percent annually. College Illinois 529 Prepaid Tuition Plan,
Frequently Asked Questions: Cancellations and Refunds, at http://www.collegeillinois.
com/entext/faqs/faq-cancellationsrefunds.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The Texas Tomorrow Fund offers refunds that will "not be
less than the amount of accumulated payments minus cancellation and administrative
fees." Texas Tomorrow Fund, Frequently Asked Questions: What if my Child Decides
not to Go to College?, at http://www.tgtp.org/faq8.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
292. It is, however, intriguing to consider the implications of permitting a market for
estate tax exemptions to develop in this fashion. We would expect the results to be
broadly redistributive, at least to the extent that the young people could negotiate with
their elders to capture some of the surplus value.
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inoperable cancer might be able to immunize a large amount of
wealth at relatively low prices because actuarial data would overly
discount the tax payment. This would obviously affect the revenues
collected through the pre-payment system. As a matter of
distributive justice, however, we might ignore this problem on the
grounds that individuals unlucky enough to die prematurely (whether
they can foresee those premature deaths or not) deserve whatever
estate tax windfall might be generated by the system. In this manner,
the pre-payment system would help compensate for the unfairness
associated with estate taxes imposed in the case of premature deaths.
Obviously, there is an even simpler solution that does not involve
the government at all: People who own large, illiquid assets can
simply plan ahead and set aside money in a bank account, which
would then grow into a fund sufficient to meet the eventual estate tax
bill. Or, better yet, they can purchase life insurance sufficient to pay
the estate tax. This avoids administrative costs, as well as any need
for a refund down the line, and it is indeed what many well-advised
wealthy people with such illiquid assets actually do today.293 Recently,
insurers have even begun to offer policies that can be cancelled for a
refund in the event the estate tax is repealed.2 " The primary
advantage associated with a governmentally-sponsored pre-payment
system is political in nature. The provision of a highly salient
mechanism for safeguarding the farm or house (effectively "insuring"
it against the estate tax) should diminish complaints associated with
the impact of the estate tax on these illiquid assets. Responsibility for
ensuring that important illiquid assets can pass tax free to heirs is
placed squarely on the taxpayer. Anecdotes concerning lost farms
would likely generate less sympathy when it is widely known that
regular, early payments could have immunized the asset.
293. See DOUGLAS HOLTz-EAKIN ET AL., ESTATE TAXES, LIFE INSURANCE, AND
SMALL BUSINESS 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7360, 1999)
(discussing a 1997 Arthur Andersen survey of family business owners with annual sales
over one million dollars, which found that "more than two-thirds of family business
owners expected life insurance to be the primary source of funds to cover estate taxes")
(citing Arthur Anderson, The Arthur Anderson/MassMutual American Family Business
Survey '97, at http://www.massmutual.com/fbn/html/res97.html (June 1997) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review)). However, Holtz-Eakin and his coauthors found that
many small business owners do not purchase life insurance that is sufficient to cover estate
taxes, even when the proceeds are combined with all the liquid assets in the estate. Id. at
23.
294. See Kelly Greene, Insurers Offer Escape Hatch for Estate Tax, WALL ST. J., May
5, 2002 (online edition), at http://online.wsj.com/public/us (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (describing an "estate tax repeal rider" currently offered by several insurers
that permits a life insurance policy to be cashed in without penalty in the event the estate
tax repeal is made permanent).
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Would people actually buy the exemptions? It is hard to know
for sure. One upshot of the pre-payment system might be a better
popular understanding of the estate tax, its liability threshold, and the
way in which its major deductions work. Once people learned more
about the estate tax (in the course of deciding whether or not to
purchase an exemption) they might come to a more realistic
assessment of their chances of being subject to it. To the extent
people discount hyperbolically, even the present value amount might
seem too weighty to justify pre-payment. Sending money off early to
the government is unlikely to be a satisfying strategy for many.
However, those same people might start to realize the value of setting
aside liquid assets or purchasing insurance against potential estate tax
liability, and this pattern of saving and hedging against risk might
have positive effects for many who will never be subject to the tax.
CONCLUSION
The estate tax is cognitively interesting. It has a unique trigger,
death-an event that is both unexpected and unavoidable. It taxes
money when the money is in transit from a departed donor to a living
beneficiary. Because of a variety of factors, behavioral distortions
associated with the tax are significantly buffered. The tax also
uniquely lends itself to serving the mission of equalizing
opportunities. Yet this tax, which could work so well from a cognitive
perspective, is at risk of being discarded for reasons that are at
bottom cognitive as well. In short, a closer look at the estate tax
through the lens of behavioral law and economics reveals both its
promise and its problems. The promise seems sufficiently bright to
warrant further work directed at overcoming the problems.
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